In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats agent registration race
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() registers the stats agent through mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(). The helper publishes the agent in hv_vhca->agents[type] under agents_lock and immediately schedules an asynchronous control invalidation on the HV VHCA workqueue before returning to mlx5e.
The asynchronous invalidation invokes the control agent's invalidate callback, which reads the hypervisor control block and forwards the command to mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_control(). That callback may either:
- call cancel_delayed_work_sync(&priv->stats_agent.work), or
- call queue_delayed_work(priv->wq, &sagent->work, sagent->delay).
However, the delayed_work and priv->stats_agent.agent are only initialized after mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create() returns to mlx5e:
agent = mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(...); /* publish + invalidate */ ... priv->stats_agent.agent = agent; /* too late */ INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&priv->stats_agent.work, ...); /* too late */
If the asynchronous control path runs before the two assignments above, it can:
- Operate on an uninitialized delayed_work whose timer.function is
- Re-initialize the timer later through INIT_DELAYED_WORK() while
- When the worker eventually runs, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() reads
Fix this by:
- Initializing priv->stats_agent.work before invoking
- Adding a struct mlx5_hv_vhca_agent **ctx_update out-parameter
While at it, access priv->stats_agent.agent with READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for the cross-CPU access with the worker, and clear priv->stats_agent.buf on the agent_create() failure path.