In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rds: Fix inet6_addr_lst NULL dereference when IPv6 is disabled
When booting with the 'ipv6.disable=1' parameter, inet6_addr_lst
is never initialized because inet6_init() exits before addrconf_init()
is called to initialize it. An attempt to bind an RDS socket to
an ipv6 address results in a crash in __ipv6_chk_addr_and_flags()
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
RIP: 0010:__ipv6_chk_addr_and_flags+0x1df/0x7e0
Call Trace:
ipv6_chk_addr+0x3b/0x50
rds_tcp_laddr_check+0x155/0x3b0 [rds_tcp]
rds_trans_get_preferred+0x15d/0x2d0 [rds]
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2d/0x110
rds_bind+0x1433/0x1d60 [rds]
? rds_remove_bound+0xd50/0xd50 [rds]
? aa_af_perm+0x250/0x250
? __might_fault+0xde/0x190
? __sys_bind+0x1dc/0x210
__sys_bind+0x1dc/0x210
? __ia32_sys_socketpair+0x100/0x100
? restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x53/0x100
__x64_sys_bind+0x73/0xb0
? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
RIP: 0033:0x7f47f8269ea9
The following code reproduces the issue:
struct sockaddr_in6 addr;
s = socket(PF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
inet_pton(AF_INET6, ADDRESS, &addr.sin6_addr);
addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
addr.sin6_port = htons(PORT);
bind(s, &addr, sizeof(addr));
Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
(linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
- EG Severity
- Not assessed: no CVSS publishedA missing CVSS is not a severity of zero.
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-17). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- No SSVC decision: EchelonGraph has not assessed this CVECISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the BOD 26-04 block below.
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it