In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: NFIT: core: Fix acpi_nfit_init() error cleanup
If acpi_nfit_init() fails after adding the acpi_desc object to the
acpi_descs list, that object is never removed from that list because
the acpi_nfit_shutdown() devm action is not added for the NFIT device
in that case. Next, the acpi_nfit_init() failure causes
acpi_nfit_probe() to fail, the acpi_desc object is freed, and a
dangling pointer is left behind in the acpi_descs. Any subsequent
ACPI Machine Check Exception will trigger nfit_handle_mce() which
iterates over acpi_descs and so a use-after-free will occur.
Moreover, if acpi_nfit_probe() returns 0 after installing a notify
handler for the NFIT device and without allocating the acpi_desc
object and setting the NFIT device's driver data pointer, the
acpi_desc object will be allocated by acpi_nfit_update_notify()
and acpi_nfit_init() will be called to initialize it. Regardless
of whether or not acpi_nfit_init() fails in that case, the
acpi_nfit_shutdown() devm action is not added for the NFIT device
and acpi_desc is never removed from the acpi_descs list. If the
acpi_desc object is freed subsequently on driver removal, any
subsequent ACPI MCE will lead to a use-after-free like in the
previous case.
To address the first issue mentioned above, make acpi_nfit_probe()
call acpi_nfit_shutdown() directly on acpi_nfit_init() failures and
to address the other one, add a remove callback to the driver and
make it call acpi_nfit_shutdown(). Also, since it is now possible to
pass NULL to acpi_nfit_shutdown() or the acpi_desc object passed to it
may not have been initialized, add checks against NULL for acpi_desc and
its nvdimm_bus field to that function and make acpi_nfit_unregister()
clear the latter after unregistering the NVDIMM bus.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.0): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.0 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.0 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-27). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it