In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: loongson - Remove broken and unused loongson-rng
The loongson-rng rng_alg has several vulnerabilities, including not
providing forward security, and a use-after-free bug due to the use of
wait_for_completion_interruptible().
Meanwhile, the rng_alg framework doesn't really have any purpose in the
first place other than to access the software algorithms crypto/drbg.c
and crypto/jitterentropy.c. Hardware-specific rng_algs have no
in-kernel user, and unlike hwrng there's no feed into the actual Linux
RNG. As such, there's really no point to this code. There are of
course other rng_alg drivers that are similarly unused, but they're
similarly in the process of being phased out, e.g.
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] and
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Given that, there's no point in fixing forward these vulnerabilities,
and it makes much more sense to simply roll back the addition of this
driver. If this platform provides TRNG (not PRNG) functionality, it
could make sense to add a hwrng driver, but it would be quite different.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it