In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: atmel_mxt_ts - fix boundary check in mxt_prepare_cfg_mem
When a configuration file provides an object size that is larger than the driver's known mxt_obj_size(object), the driver intends to discard the extra bytes.
The loop iterates using for (i = 0; i < size; i++). Inside the loop, the condition to skip processing extra bytes is:
if (i > mxt_obj_size(object)) continue;
Since i is a 0-based index, the valid indices for the object are 0 through mxt_obj_size(object) - 1.
When i == mxt_obj_size(object), the condition evaluates to false, and the code processes the byte instead of discarding it.
This causes the code to calculate byte_offset = reg + i - cfg->start_ofs and writes the byte there, overwriting exactly one byte of the adjacent instance or object.
Update the boundary check to skip extra bytes correctly by using >=.