OpenAM: WebAuthn Java deserialization RCE via ObjectInputFilter depth>1 bypass
Summary
The GHSA-6c99-87fr-6q7r fix wrapped WebAuthn authenticator deserialization in anObjectInputFilter meant to allow only AuthenticatorImpl, but it short-circuits to ALLOWED for any object at stream depth > 1. Because the Java serialization filter is consulted for every class in the graph (and depth == 1 only for the root's concrete class), the allowlist constrains only the root and leaves the entire nested graph unchecked.Impact
An attacker can craft a stream rooted atAuthenticatorImpl with an arbitrary gadget chain nested inside. The gadget's readObject/readResolve executes during readObject() — before the cast and before any assertion verification — enabling remote code execution when a gadget is on the classpath. The deserialization sink is reached pre-authentication via an attacker-chosen userHandle.