CVE-2026-61798

HIGHPre-NVD 8.18.1
EchelonGraph scoreLOW confidence

This high-severity CVE scores 8.1 under the CNA's CVSS (NVD's own analysis pending). EPSS exploit-prediction score not yet available (the EPSS model rescores nightly; freshly-published CVEs typically appear within 48 hours). GitHub Security Advisory data not yet ingested — confidence will rise once GHSA publishes (typical lag: hours to days for open-source ecosystem CVEs; never for infrastructure-only CVEs).

Triggered by: NVD CVSS baseline
Sources: cna:github_m
8.1EG
EchelonGraph verdictPlan a fixSerious severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet.
  • High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: CVSS: 8.1Exploit: None knownExposed: 0

No vendor fix yet — apply a workaround or compensating control (WAF / firewall / segmentation) and watch for a patch.

netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BoringSSL HPKE private key bytes exposed through toString() and exception messages

Summary

io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl exposes raw HPKE private key bytes in string representations and error messages. BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString() includes the private-key parameter object, and BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString() renders the full byte array with Arrays.toString(bytes). Separately, failed native key initialization includes Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes) in the thrown IllegalArgumentException message. Applications that log key-pair objects or exceptions can persist private key material in logs.

Details

codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java renders private key material through toString():

  • BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString() at lines 72-78 concatenates "privateKey=" + privateKey.
  • privateKey is a BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter created with isPrivate=true at lines 26-36.

codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java then renders all bytes:

  • BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString() at lines 70-76 returns "bytes=" + Arrays.toString(bytes) regardless of whether isPrivate is true.

A separate error path in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java also exposes caller-provided private key bytes:

  • EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw(...) at lines 228-232 throws IllegalArgumentException("privateKeyBytes does not contain a valid private key: " + Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes)) when BoringSSL rejects the key.

Because Java logging frameworks commonly call toString() for structured objects and commonly persist exception messages, these paths can place complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry.

Proof of concept

Safe local verification was performed without native BoringSSL by compiling the relevant Java classes and a no-op native stub for the unused finalizer reference. The observed output includes the full private key byte array:

BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair{privateKey=BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter{bytes=[1, 2, 3, 4], isPrivate=true}, publicKey=BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter{bytes=[5, 6, 7, 8], isPrivate=false}}

Minimal reproducer concept in the same package:

package io.netty.incubator.codec.hpke.boringssl;

public final class VerifyPrivateKeyToString { public static void main(String[] args) { byte[] privateKey = new byte[] {1, 2, 3, 4}; byte[] publicKey = new byte[] {5, 6, 7, 8}; BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair pair = new BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair(privateKey, publicKey); System.out.println(pair.toString()); } }

The code path is deterministic: the production toString() methods concatenate the raw private-key byte array.

Impact

If an affected key pair or initialization exception is logged, application logs contain complete HPKE private key material. Anyone with access to those logs can recover the key. Depending on key reuse and log retention, this can compromise:

  • confidentiality of OHTTP messages encrypted to the exposed key;
  • integrity/authenticity expectations for future messages if the key remains active;
  • incident response and key rotation assumptions, because logs may retain key material long after the in-memory key is rotated.

Suggested remediation

  • Redact private key material in BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString() when isPrivate is true, for example bytes= or only key type/length.
  • Redact privateKey in BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString().
  • Remove Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes) from BoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw(...); report only length and KEM metadata.
  • Add regression tests asserting that toString() and exception messages do not contain private key byte values.
  • Consider making key pair classes avoid implementing detailed toString() for sensitive material entirely.

References

  • codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java:72-78
  • codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java:70-76
  • codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java:228-232

CVSS v3
8.1
EG Score
8.1(low)
EG Risk
41(Track)
EG Risk 41/100SSVC: Track

EG Risk is EchelonGraph's 0–100 priority score: it fuses intrinsic severity with real-world exploitation and automatability so you can rank equal-severity CVEs and fix the most dangerous first. Higher = act sooner. Distinct from the 0–10 EG Score (severity).

How it’s computed
Severity81% × 45%
Exploitation0% × 40%
Automatability30% × 15%
Action: Routine — remediate on your standard cadence.
EPSS PROB
EPSS %ILE
KEV
Not listed

Published

August 20, 2026

Last Modified

August 20, 2026

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-61798(1)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 1× in last 7d / 1× in last 30d)

Each row is a source pipeline that fetched or updated this CVE on that date, with what changed. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed it from the CNA feed. Most recent first.

  1. 2026-08-20 19:42 UTCEG score recompute

Frequently asked(4)

What is CVE-2026-61798?
CVE-2026-61798 is a high vulnerability published on August 20, 2026. netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BoringSSL HPKE private key bytes exposed through toString() and exception messages Summary io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl exposes raw HPKE private key bytes in string representations and error messages.…
When was CVE-2026-61798 disclosed?
CVE-2026-61798 was first published in the National Vulnerability Database on August 20, 2026. EchelonGraph re-ingests CVE updates from NVD on a 2-hour cycle, so this page reflects the latest published state.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-61798?
CVE-2026-61798 has a CVSS v4.0 base score of 8.1 (CNA self-assessment; NVD's own analysis pending). The EG score is currently aggregating — additional source signals are being incorporated as they become available..
How do I remediate CVE-2026-61798?
Patch to the fixed version published by the affected vendor. Where vendor advisories exist for CVE-2026-61798, EchelonGraph cross-links them in the Vendor Advisories panel below — those typically contain the canonical remediation steps, fixed version numbers, and any vendor-specific mitigations.

Dependency Blast Radius

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