EchelonGraph verdictPlan mitigationRemediate within your standard update timelines (the SSVC decision on this page).
- •High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.7%CVSS: 9.0Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed
No fix is confirmed yet — apply a workaround or compensating control (WAF / firewall / segmentation) and watch for the fix.
The CVE record's CNA (Eclipse Foundation) lists Eclipse Foundation Eclipse BaSyx - Java Server SDK versions 2.0.0-milestone-05 up to but not including 2.0.0-milestone-13 as affected. No release containing a fix is confirmed on record.
In Eclipse BaSyx Java Server SDK versions 2.0.0-milestone-05 to 2.0.0-milestone-12, deployments using the MongoDB backend are vulnerable to an unauthenticated arbitrary file write through the AAS thumbnail API.
The AAS thumbnail upload path accepted a client-controlled fileName request parameter and passed it through repository file handling as both a repository key and, during thumbnail retrieval, a local filesystem path. With the MongoDB file repository, the supplied filename was treated as an opaque GridFS key and was not normalized or restricted as a filesystem path. A remote attacker could upload thumbnail content using an absolute or traversal-style filename, then trigger thumbnail retrieval so that the uploaded bytes were written to the attacker-chosen path on the server filesystem.
This could allow writing files anywhere the Java process has permission to write and may lead to remote code execution. The default InMemory backend is not affected by this specific path because it normalizes and restricts file paths to its temporary directory.
The issue is fixed in Eclipse BaSyx Java Server SDK 2.0.0-milestone-13.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
No fix is confirmed yet. Restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation within your standard update timelines, and watch the vendor's advisory for the fix.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it