In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: fastrpc: fix use-after-free of fastrpc_user in workqueue context
There is a race between fastrpc_device_release() and the workqueue that processes DSP responses. When the user closes the file descriptor, fastrpc_device_release() frees the fastrpc_user structure. Concurrently, an in-flight DSP invocation can complete and fastrpc_rpmsg_callback() schedules context cleanup via schedule_work(&ctx->put_work). If the workqueue runs fastrpc_context_free() in parallel with or after fastrpc_device_release() has freed the user structure, it dereferences the freed fastrpc_user. Depending on the state of the context at the time of the race, any one of the following accesses can be hit:
- fastrpc_buf_free() calls fastrpc_ipa_to_dma_addr(buf->fl->cctx, ...)
- fastrpc_free_map() reads map->fl->cctx->vmperms[0].vmid to
- fastrpc_free_map() acquires map->fl->lock to safely remove the
The resulting use-after-free manifests as:
pc : fastrpc_buf_free+0x38/0x80 [fastrpc] lr : fastrpc_context_free+0xa8/0x1b0 [fastrpc] fastrpc_context_free+0xa8/0x1b0 [fastrpc] fastrpc_context_put_wq+0x78/0xa0 [fastrpc] process_one_work+0x180/0x450 worker_thread+0x26c/0x388
Add kref-based reference counting to fastrpc_user. Have each invoke context take a reference on the user at allocation time and release it when the context is freed. Release the initial reference in fastrpc_device_release() at file close. Move the teardown of the user structure — freeing pending contexts, maps, mmaps, and the channel context reference — into the kref release callback fastrpc_user_free(), so that it runs only when the last reference is dropped, regardless of whether that happens at device close or after the final in-flight context completes.