@hulumi/policies has a HULUMI-H5 bypass via decoy sibling resources targeting a different bucket
Affected: @hulumi/policies < 1.4.0 — Fixed in: 1.4.0 — Severity: High — CWE-284 (Improper Access Control)
Summary
HULUMI-H1 forbids raw aws:s3:Bucket outside of Hulumi's SecureBucket component, with one exemption: a raw bucket that's a child of a SecureBucket is allowed because the component is responsible for the hardening. HULUMI-H5 is the defence-in-depth check that closes the H1 exemption — for any raw bucket claiming it, H5 verifies the five hardening sibling resources a real SecureBucket always emits (public-access block, SSE-KMS, ownership controls, versioning, TLS-only bucket policy) are actually present.
The bug: H5 only checked the siblings' _types_. It never verified that those siblings actually applied to the bucket being exempted. A consumer (or compromised PR) could pair an unhardened raw bucket with five hardening sibling resources whose bucket property pointed at a _completely different_ bucket, and H5 would report no violation while the actual bucket shipped with zero hardened defaults.
Impact
Consumers using HulumiHardeningPack could ship a raw S3 bucket with no public-access block, no SSE-KMS, no ownership controls, no versioning, and no TLS-only bucket policy — while the policy pack reported the stack as compliant.
Patches
Upgrade to @hulumi/[email protected]. The H5 sibling check now requires both (a) the sibling to share the same parent SecureBucket instance via the anchored URN helper from GHSA-2, AND (b) the sibling's bucket property — or, for the bucket policy, its Resource ARN list — to reference the exempted bucket explicitly. Five decoy siblings pointing at a different bucket no longer count.
Workarounds
None — the exemption itself is the mechanism, so the value-binding check is the only fix.