CVE-2026-46223

MEDIUMCVSS · not yet scored5.5
EchelonGraph scoreLOW confidence

Score 5.5 from GitHub Security Advisory published 2026-05-28.

Triggered by: GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
Sources: EPSS, GitHub Security Advisory
5.5EG
EchelonGraph verdictMonitorRemediate within your standard update timelines (the SSVC decision on this page).
  • Lower severity and no public exploit yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.1%CVSS v2: —Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed

A fix is available — apply it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

cgroup: Defer css percpu_ref kill on rmdir until cgroup is depopulated

A chain of commits going back to v7.0 reworked rmdir to satisfy the controller invariant that a subsystem's ->css_offline() must not run while tasks are still doing kernel-side work in the cgroup.

[1] d245698d727a ("cgroup: Defer task cgroup unlink until after the task is done switching out") [2] a72f73c4dd9b ("cgroup: Don't expose dead tasks in cgroup") [3] 1b164b876c36 ("cgroup: Wait for dying tasks to leave on rmdir") [4] 4c56a8ac6869 ("cgroup: Fix cgroup_drain_dying() testing the wrong condition") [5] 13e786b64bd3 ("cgroup: Increment nr_dying_subsys_* from rmdir context")

[1] moved task cset unlink from do_exit() to finish_task_switch() so a task's cset link drops only after the task has fully stopped scheduling. That made tasks past exit_signals() linger on cset->tasks until their final context switch, which led to a series of problems as what userspace expected to see after rmdir diverged from what the kernel needs to wait for. [2]-[5] tried to bridge that divergence: [2] filtered the exiting tasks from cgroup.procs; [3] had rmdir(2) sleep in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE for them; [4] fixed the wait's condition; [5] made nr_dying_subsys_* visible synchronously.

The cgroup_drain_dying() wait in [3] turned out to be a dead end. When the rmdir caller is also the reaper of a zombie that pins a pidns teardown (e.g. host PID 1 systemd reaping orphan pids that were re-parented to it during the same teardown), rmdir blocks in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE waiting for those pids to free, the pids can't free because PID 1 is the reaper and it's stuck in rmdir, and the system A-A deadlocks. No internal lock ordering breaks this; the wait itself is the bug.

The css killing side that drove the original reorder, however, can be made cleanly asynchronous: ->css_offline() is already async, run from css_killed_work_fn() driven by percpu_ref_kill_and_confirm(). The fix is to make that chain start only after all tasks have left the cgroup. rmdir's user-visible side then returns as soon as cgroup.procs and friends are empty, while ->css_offline() still runs only after the cgroup is fully drained.

Verified by the original reproducer (pidns teardown + zombie reaper, runs under vng) which hangs vanilla and succeeds here, and by per-commit deterministic repros for [2], [3], [4], [5] with a boot parameter that widens the post-exit_signals() window so each state is reliably reachable. Some stress tests on top of that.

cgroup_apply_control_disable() has the same shape of pre-existing race: when a controller is disabled via subtree_control, kill_css() ran synchronously while tasks past exit_signals() could still be linked to the cgroup's csets, and ->css_offline() could fire before they drained. This patch preserves the existing synchronous behavior at that call site (kill_css_sync() + kill_css_finish() back-to-back) and a follow-up patch will defer kill_css_finish() there using a per-css trigger.

This seems like the right approach and I don't see problems with it. The changes are somewhat invasive but not excessively so, so backporting to -stable should be okay. If something does turn out to be wrong, the fallback is to revert the entire chain ([1]-[5]) and rework in the development branch instead.

v2: Pin cgrp across the deferred destroy work with explicit cgroup_get()/cgroup_put() around queue_work() and the work_fn. v1 wasn't actually broken (ordered cgroup_offline_wq + queue_work order in cgroup_task_dead() saved it) but the explicit ref removes the dependency on those non-obvious invariants. Also note the pre-existing cgroup_apply_control_disable() race in the description; a follow-up will defer kill_css_finish() there.

CVSS v3
—
EG Score
5.5MEDIUMlow confidence
EG Risk
25
EG Risk 25/100

EG Risk is EchelonGraph's 0–100 priority score. It fuses impact severity (EG Severity, the CVSS base score, never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score) with real-world exploitation and automatability, under weights EchelonGraph set by hand, so you can rank equal-severity CVEs and fix the most dangerous first. Higher = act sooner.

How it’s computed (value × EchelonGraph’s weight)
Severity55% × 45%
Impact severity (EG Severity): CVSS 5.5 of 10. Never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score.
Exploitation0.1% × 40%
FIRST EPSS: the 30-day exploitation probability when EchelonGraph scored this CVE.
Automatability0% × 15%
CISA's BOD 26-04 default: no one has published Automatable for this CVE, and CISA treats it as “no” for a CVE not in KEV.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph): Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE.
Action: A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
EPSS PROB
0.1%
EPSS %ILE
1st
KEV
Not listed

What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)

The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.

EG Severity
5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
EG Likelihood
0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-17). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
Confirmed exploitation
None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
EG Priority
SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.

SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).

A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.

Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table

BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.

In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it

Published

May 28, 2026

Last Modified

June 14, 2026

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-46223(1)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Patch Availability(10)

Patches are aggregated from vendor advisories (Red Hat, Microsoft, Cisco, GitHub) and package ecosystems (OSV, GHSA). Multiple rows for the same upstream release have been deduplicated.

Affected Packages

(1 across 1 ecosystem)
Debian:14(1)
PackageVulnerable rangeFix by version rangeDependents
linux6.12.100-1 ... 7.0.9-1~bpo13+1 (139 versions)
  • every version up to 7.0.9-1: fixed in 7.0.9-1
—

Weakness Classification(1)

MITRE Common Weakness Enumeration — the root-cause categories this CVE belongs to.

All Vendor Advisories

(9)

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 6× in last 7d / 25× in last 30d)

Each row is a time one of our pipelines fetched, updated or re-scored this CVE. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed it from the CNA feed. An arrow marks a change the record states ("CVSS v3 → 9.1"); EPSS and GHSA rows show the values recorded at that time, not what changed (EPSS values are rounded; hover one for the exact figures). Most recent first.

Showing the most recent 100 of 202 refreshes on record for this CVE.

A repeat, a row identical to one the same pipeline wrote less than 10 seconds earlier, is not a separate refresh and is not counted. None are among the latest 100 rows. The 102 oldest rows on record are not shown and were not checked, so the counts can still include repeats.

  1. 2026-10-18 16:32 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  2. 2026-10-18 03:37 UTCEG score recompute
  3. 2026-10-17 16:34 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  4. 2026-10-15 16:32 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  5. 2026-10-14 16:33 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  6. 2026-10-13 16:34 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  7. 2026-10-12 16:34 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  8. 2026-10-12 16:03 UTCEG score recompute
  9. 2026-10-11 19:45 UTCEG score recompute
  10. 2026-10-11 17:00 UTCEG score recompute
  11. 2026-10-11 14:25 UTCEG score recompute
  12. 2026-10-10 20:00 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  13. 2026-10-09 20:07 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  14. 2026-10-08 17:12 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  15. 2026-10-07 23:48 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  16. 2026-10-06 15:18 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  17. 2026-10-05 17:43 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  18. 2026-10-04 23:22 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  19. 2026-10-03 15:49 UTCOSV refresh
  20. 2026-10-03 14:25 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  21. 2026-10-01 19:50 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  22. 2026-09-30 15:03 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  23. 2026-09-27 13:48 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  24. 2026-09-26 15:58 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  25. 2026-09-23 17:53 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
Show 75 more
  1. 2026-09-18 19:28 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  2. 2026-09-17 19:31 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  3. 2026-09-16 14:08 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  4. 2026-09-16 05:15 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  5. 2026-09-14 06:53 UTCEG score recompute
  6. 2026-09-14 06:53 UTCVendor advisory
  7. 2026-09-14 06:53 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  8. 2026-09-13 02:39 UTCOSV refresh
  9. 2026-09-12 15:01 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  10. 2026-09-11 14:53 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  11. 2026-09-11 09:37 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  12. 2026-09-10 09:34 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  13. 2026-09-04 05:06 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  14. 2026-09-01 13:54 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  15. 2026-08-30 19:17 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  16. 2026-08-28 21:41 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  17. 2026-08-27 14:25 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  18. 2026-08-25 13:49 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  19. 2026-08-25 04:46 UTCEG score recompute
  20. 2026-08-25 04:46 UTCVendor advisory
  21. 2026-08-25 04:46 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  22. 2026-08-23 14:32 UTCEG score recompute
  23. 2026-08-23 14:32 UTCVendor advisory
  24. 2026-08-23 14:32 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  25. 2026-08-23 00:19 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  26. 2026-08-21 15:28 UTCEG score recompute
  27. 2026-08-21 15:28 UTCVendor advisory
  28. 2026-08-21 15:27 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  29. 2026-08-20 22:55 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  30. 2026-08-20 10:48 UTCEG score recompute
  31. 2026-08-20 10:48 UTCVendor advisory
  32. 2026-08-20 10:48 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  33. 2026-08-19 17:04 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  34. 2026-08-17 13:47 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  35. 2026-08-17 08:29 UTCEG score recompute
  36. 2026-08-17 08:29 UTCVendor advisory
  37. 2026-08-17 08:29 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  38. 2026-08-16 14:56 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  39. 2026-08-16 02:35 UTCVendor advisory
  40. 2026-08-16 02:35 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  41. 2026-08-15 03:33 UTCVendor advisory
  42. 2026-08-15 03:33 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  43. 2026-08-14 05:47 UTCVendor advisory
  44. 2026-08-14 05:47 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  45. 2026-08-13 08:02 UTCVendor advisory
  46. 2026-08-13 08:02 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  47. 2026-08-12 09:52 UTCEG score recompute
  48. 2026-08-12 09:52 UTCVendor advisory
  49. 2026-08-12 09:52 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  50. 2026-08-11 12:06 UTCEG score recompute
  51. 2026-08-11 12:06 UTCVendor advisory
  52. 2026-08-11 12:06 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  53. 2026-08-11 00:00 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  54. 2026-08-10 14:02 UTCVendor advisory
  55. 2026-08-10 14:02 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  56. 2026-08-09 16:16 UTCVendor advisory
  57. 2026-08-09 16:16 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  58. 2026-08-08 18:31 UTCEG score recompute
  59. 2026-08-08 18:31 UTCVendor advisory
  60. 2026-08-08 18:31 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  61. 2026-08-08 16:37 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  62. 2026-08-07 17:06 UTCVendor advisory
  63. 2026-08-07 17:06 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  64. 2026-08-06 19:20 UTCVendor advisory
  65. 2026-08-06 19:20 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  66. 2026-08-05 21:35 UTCEG score recompute
  67. 2026-08-05 21:35 UTCVendor advisory
  68. 2026-08-05 21:35 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  69. 2026-08-05 19:17 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  70. 2026-08-04 23:50 UTCEG score recompute
  71. 2026-08-04 23:50 UTCVendor advisory
  72. 2026-08-04 23:50 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-r8hv-j9g9-64g6 · GitHub CVSS 5.5
  73. 2026-08-04 15:10 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  74. 2026-08-04 10:39 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS <0.1% · below the 1st percentile
  75. 2026-08-03 16:12 UTCVendor advisory

Frequently asked(4)

What is CVE-2026-46223?
CVE-2026-46223 is a medium-severity vulnerability; its CVE record was published on May 28, 2026. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Defer css percpu_ref kill on rmdir until cgroup is depopulated A chain of commits going back to v7.0 reworked rmdir to satisfy the controller invariant that a subsystem's ->css_offline() must not run while tasks are still…
When was the CVE record for CVE-2026-46223 published?
The CVE record for CVE-2026-46223 was published on May 28, 2026. That is the record's publication date; the vulnerability itself may have been made public earlier. EchelonGraph's copy of the record carries a last-modified date of June 14, 2026; the record at its source may have been updated since.
Is CVE-2026-46223 actively exploited?
CVE-2026-46223 is not currently on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. FIRST EPSS estimates a 0.1% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days (1st percentile of EPSS-scored CVEs).
How do I remediate CVE-2026-46223?
A fix for CVE-2026-46223 is available: update to the fixed version the vendor names in its advisory. The vendor advisories EchelonGraph has for CVE-2026-46223 are linked in the Vendor Advisories panel on this page.

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