In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: ioam: fix heap buffer overflow in __ioam6_fill_trace_data()
On the receive path, __ioam6_fill_trace_data() uses trace->nodelen to decide how much data to write for each node. It trusts this field as-is from the incoming packet, with no consistency check against trace->type (the 24-bit field that tells which data items are present). A crafted packet can set nodelen=0 while setting type bits 0-21, causing the function to write ~100 bytes past the allocated region (into skb_shared_info), which corrupts adjacent heap memory and leads to a kernel panic.
Add a shared helper ioam6_trace_compute_nodelen() in ioam6.c to derive the expected nodelen from the type field, and use it:
- in ioam6_iptunnel.c (send path, existing validation) to replace
- in exthdrs.c (receive path, ipv6_hop_ioam) to drop packets whose
Per RFC 9197, bits 12-21 are each short (4-octet) fields, so they are included in IOAM6_MASK_SHORT_FIELDS (changed from 0xff100000 to 0xff1ffc00).