Issue summary: A server configured with the Suite B certificate flag through
SSL_CTX_set_cert_flags() and with TLS 1.3 enabled may read past the end of a
fixed group list when it processes a ClientHello whose supported_groups and
key_share contain no Suite B group.
Impact summary: A remote client can send a ClientHello that makes the server
read past the end of a static array. The values read are never returned to the
client, so no memory is disclosed; on builds with sanitizers or hardened
allocators the read may crash the process, causing Denial of Service.
CWE: CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read
Description: When the Suite B certificate flag is set, OpenSSL restricts the
accepted groups to P-256 and P-384 by substituting a fixed two-element list
for the configured group list. The tuple machinery used for key-share
selection was not updated for this substitution: tls1_get_group_tuples() still
returns the configured tuples, which by default describe eight groups. The
server-side walk in tls_parse_ctos_key_share() then advances through the
two-element list using those tuple counts without checking the cumulative
offset against the number of groups present.
Only applications that call SSL_CTX_set_cert_flags() with
SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS and leave TLS 1.3 enabled are affected. The
openssl s_server -suiteB_128 option sets an X.509 verification parameter
instead, so the stock command line server is not vulnerable. Default
configurations do not reach this code.
A client that offers only groups outside the Suite B set, such as X25519,
forces every tuple to be walked and the read to run past the array. The bytes
read are compared against client group IDs and never sent back, so no memory
is disclosed. On builds with address sanitizers or hardened allocators the
read can abort the process; in ordinary release builds it reads a few bytes of
adjacent constant data.
FIPS impact: no
The affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.3): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.3 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it