EchelonGraph verdictMonitorRemediate within your standard update timelines (the SSVC decision on this page).
- •Lower severity and no public exploit yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.4%CVSS: 5.9Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed
The following software releases have been updated to resolve this specific issue: Junos OS Evolved: 24.4R2-S3-EVO, 25.2R2-EVO, 25.4R1-EVO, and all subsequent releases (from the CVE record's solution, Juniper Networks, Inc.) — apply it.
An Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in the
advanced forwarding toolkit (evo-aftmand)
of Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved on PTX Series allows an unauthenticated network-based attacker generating continuous routing updates, resulting in unilist ECMP routes, to crash the
evo-aftmand process on the PFE, leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS). The conditions required for successful exploitation are based on a sequence of events that are outside an attacker's direct control.
Unified list (unilist) ECMP routes are a specific ECMP behavior where multiple equal-cost routes share a single logical next-hop list entry. The router treats them as one route with multiple next hops and load balances traffic across that unified list. Due to an issue processing unilist ECMP routing updates, internal state corruption may occur, especially in large-scale ECMP unilist deployments, leading to the evo-aftmand process crashing, resulting in an evo-aftmand-bx core. Manual intervention is required to recover by rebooting the system or restarting the FPC.
This issue affects Junos OS Evolved on PTX :
* from 24.4R2-EVO before 24.4R2-S3-EVO;
* from 25.2 before 25.2R2-EVO.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
The following software releases have been updated to resolve this specific issue: Junos OS Evolved: 24.4R2-S3-EVO, 25.2R2-EVO, 25.4R1-EVO, and all subsequent releases (from the CVE record's solution, Juniper Networks, Inc.). Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it