In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Fix stale direct dispatch state in ddsp_dsq_id
@p->scx.ddsp_dsq_id can be left set (non-SCX_DSQ_INVALID) triggering a
spurious warning in mark_direct_dispatch() when the next wakeup's
ops.select_cpu() calls scx_bpf_dsq_insert(), such as:
WARNING: kernel/sched/ext.c:1273 at scx_dsq_insert_commit+0xcd/0x140
The root cause is that ddsp_dsq_id was only cleared in dispatch_enqueue(),
which is not reached in all paths that consume or cancel a direct dispatch
verdict.
Fix it by clearing it at the right places:
- direct_dispatch(): cache the direct dispatch state in local variables
and clear it before dispatch_enqueue() on the synchronous path. For
the deferred path, the direct dispatch state must remain set until
process_ddsp_deferred_locals() consumes them.
- process_ddsp_deferred_locals(): cache the dispatch state in local
variables and clear it before calling dispatch_to_local_dsq(), which
may migrate the task to another rq.
- do_enqueue_task(): clear the dispatch state on the enqueue path
(local/global/bypass fallbacks), where the direct dispatch verdict is
ignored.
- dequeue_task_scx(): clear the dispatch state after dispatch_dequeue()
to handle both the deferred dispatch cancellation and the holding_cpu
race, covering all cases where a pending direct dispatch is
cancelled.
- scx_disable_task(): clear the direct dispatch state when
transitioning a task out of the current scheduler. Waking tasks may
have had the direct dispatch state set by the outgoing scheduler's
ops.select_cpu() and then been queued on a wake_list via
ttwu_queue_wakelist(), when SCX_OPS_ALLOW_QUEUED_WAKEUP is set. Such
tasks are not on the runqueue and are not iterated by scx_bypass(),
so their direct dispatch state won't be cleared. Without this clear,
any subsequent SCX scheduler that tries to direct dispatch the task
will trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE() in mark_direct_dispatch().
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it