In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: Fix RSS LUT NULL pointer crash on early ethtool operations
The RSS LUT is not initialized until the interface comes up, causing
the following NULL pointer crash when ethtool operations like rxhash on/off
are performed before the interface is brought up for the first time.
Move RSS LUT initialization from ndo_open to vport creation to ensure LUT
is always available. This enables RSS configuration via ethtool before
bringing the interface up. Simplify LUT management by maintaining all
changes in the driver's soft copy and programming zeros to the indirection
table when rxhash is disabled. Defer HW programming until the interface
comes up if it is down during rxhash and LUT configuration changes.
Steps to reproduce:
** Load idpf driver; interfaces will be created
modprobe idpf
** Before bringing the interfaces up, turn rxhash off
ethtool -K eth2 rxhash off
[89408.371875] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[89408.371908] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[89408.371924] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[89408.371940] PGD 0 P4D 0
[89408.371953] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[89408.372052] RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0x16/0x130
[89408.372310] Call Trace:
[89408.372317]
[89408.372326] ? idpf_set_features+0xfc/0x180 [idpf]
[89408.372363] __netdev_update_features+0x295/0xde0
[89408.372384] ethnl_set_features+0x15e/0x460
[89408.372406] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x11f/0x180
[89408.372429] genl_rcv_msg+0x1ad/0x2b0
[89408.372446] ? __pfx_ethnl_set_features+0x10/0x10
[89408.372465] ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[89408.372482] netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x100
[89408.372502] genl_rcv+0x2c/0x50
[89408.372516] netlink_unicast+0x289/0x3e0
[89408.372533] netlink_sendmsg+0x215/0x440
[89408.372551] __sys_sendto+0x234/0x240
[89408.372571] __x64_sys_sendto+0x28/0x30
[89408.372585] x64_sys_call+0x1909/0x1da0
[89408.372604] do_syscall_64+0x7a/0xfa0
[89408.373140] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x60/0xb0
[89408.373647] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[89408.378887]
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-05). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it