CVE-2026-127916

LOWPre-NVD 2.92.9
EchelonGraph scoreMEDIUM confidence

“—” beside the score: it is equal to the CVSS score beside it.

This low-severity CVE scores 2.9 under a secondary CVSS source (NVD's own analysis pending). EPSS exploit probability: 0.2% (4th percentile of EPSS-scored CVEs). No GitHub Security Advisory CVSS is on record for this CVE.

Triggered by: Headline CVSS from a secondary CVSS source
Sources: EPSS, a secondary CVSS source

Also known asEUVD-2026-124792 (ENISA EUVD)Source: ENISA EUVD

2.9EG
EchelonGraph verdictMonitorNo release containing the referenced fix is confirmed: check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule (the SSVC decision on this page).
  • Lower severity and no public exploit yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.2%CVSS: 2.9Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed

A fix is referenced (a reference tagged "Patch", often a source commit), but no release containing it is confirmed — find the release that contains it; until it is applied, mitigate (WAF / firewall / segmentation).

bootutil_img_hash() computes the image digest over ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size + ih_protect_tlv_size bytes, all three taken from the candidate image's header, and reads that span out of the slot without checking that it fits in the flash area. The three sizes are also summed without an overflow check. Nothing earlier on the validation path bounds the whole span either: bootutil_img_validate() compares the image size against bootutil_max_image_size() only after the hash has been computed.

The callers bound part of the span, or none of it:

On the swap and overwrite upgrade path, boot_validate_slot() first runs the image header check (boot_is_header_valid(), later boot_check_header_valid()). Before MCUboot 2.2.0 that check covered only ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size, so for every image the protected-TLV area (ih_protect_tlv_size, a uint16_t, up to 65535 bytes) was hashed without being bounded. From 2.2.0 the check includes ih_protect_tlv_size, except for a compressed image in the secondary slot when MCUBOOT_DECOMPRESS_IMAGES (CONFIG_BOOT_DECOMPRESSION) is enabled, which leaves the same gap of up to 64 KB. Zephyr's single-slot and firmware loaders (boot/zephyr/single_loader.c, boot/zephyr/firmware_loader.c) read the header with boot_image_load_header(), which bounds ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size against the flash area. Before MCUboot 2.4.0 that bound did not include ih_protect_tlv_size, which leaves the same gap of up to 64 KB. From 2.4.0 these loaders bound the whole span. The serial recovery image-list and image-state handlers (bs_list() and bs_set() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c) call bootutil_img_validate() with no header check at all, so on those paths ih_img_size is unbounded as well.

The image is hashed before its signature is checked, so anyone who can place an image in a slot (an OTA or SMP update delivered through the application, or serial recovery) reaches this read before authentication.

Whether a malformed header produces an actual read beyond the area depends on the flash backend:

Backends whose flash_area_read() bounds-checks the request (Zephyr, Espressif, NuttX, Mbed) return an error once the chunked read crosses the end of the area. Validation fails and the image is rejected, with no over-read. With MCUBOOT_HASH_STORAGE_DIRECTLY (Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_IMG_HASH_DIRECTLY_ON_STORAGE, available from 2.2.0, not enabled by default) the span is hashed through a single direct pointer into memory-mapped flash, with no bounds check. The Cypress PSoC6 port's flash_area_read() (boot/cypress/cy_flash_pal/cy_flash_map.c, from 1.6.0) does not bound the read: its assert()s compare against the area's absolute offset rather than its size, and it copies with memcpy().

The bytes read past the area feed only the digest, which is compared internally and never returned, so nothing is disclosed. The realistic effect is a read fault during image validation: up to 64 KB past the slot on the upgrade path and, before 2.4.0, on the Zephyr loaders, and potentially much further on the serial recovery handlers, which skip the header check. Where validation is repeated at every boot (a pending upgrade, or, before 2.4.0, the single-slot loader checking its image), the fault can recur on each reset and keep the device from booting.

The fix makes bootutil_img_hash() add the three sizes with boot_u32_safe_add() and reject an image whose span, including the sector offset used in swap-using-offset mode, does not fit in the flash area, before any of it is hashed. Because the bound is applied where the bytes are read, it covers every caller.

CVSS v3
2.9
EG Score
2.9LOWmedium confidence
EG Risk
13
EG Risk 13/100

EG Risk is EchelonGraph's 0–100 priority score. It fuses impact severity (EG Severity, the CVSS base score, never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score) with real-world exploitation and automatability, under weights EchelonGraph set by hand, so you can rank equal-severity CVEs and fix the most dangerous first. Higher = act sooner.

How it’s computed (value × EchelonGraph’s weight)
Severity29% × 45%
Impact severity (EG Severity): CVSS 2.9 of 10. Never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score.
Exploitation0.1% × 40%
FIRST EPSS: the 30-day exploitation probability when EchelonGraph scored this CVE.
Automatability0% × 15%
CISA's SSVC Automatable value: no (Vulnrichment).
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph): Track at every mission impact level.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE.
Action: A fix is referenced, but no release containing it is confirmed. Check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule.
EPSS PROB
0.2%
EPSS %ILE
4th
KEV
Not listed

What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)

The EG score (2.9): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 2.9 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.

EG Severity
2.9 LOWCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
EG Likelihood
0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
Confirmed exploitation
None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
EG Priority
SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.

SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.

A fix is referenced, but no release containing it is confirmed. Check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule.

Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table

BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.

No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.

The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it

Published

November 13, 2026

Last Modified

November 17, 2026

Weakness Classification(1)

MITRE Common Weakness Enumeration — the root-cause categories this CVE belongs to.

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 6× in last 7d / 11× in last 30d)

Each row is a time one of our pipelines fetched, updated or re-scored this CVE. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed its CVE.org record (CNA or CISA ADP). An arrow marks a change the record states ("CVSS v3 → 9.1"); EPSS and GHSA rows show the values recorded at that time, not what changed (EPSS values are rounded; hover one for the exact figures). "EchelonGraph re-scored" is our own recompute of this CVE's score, not an update from a source, and is not counted in the refreshes above. Most recent first.

  1. 2026-11-21 16:38 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.2% · 4th percentile
  2. 2026-11-20 16:36 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  3. 2026-11-19 16:33 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  4. 2026-11-18 16:34 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  5. 2026-11-17 17:31 UTCEchelonGraph re-scored
  6. 2026-11-17 16:34 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  7. 2026-11-17 16:30 UTCEchelonGraph re-scored
  8. 2026-11-16 16:49 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  9. 2026-11-15 16:57 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  10. 2026-11-14 16:39 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  11. 2026-11-13 22:29 UTCEchelonGraph re-scored
  12. 2026-11-13 22:03 UTCEchelonGraph re-scored
  13. 2026-11-13 16:50 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.1% · 1st percentile
  14. 2026-11-13 02:28 UTCEchelonGraph re-scored
  15. 2026-11-13 01:01 UTCENISA EUVD ID recordedEUVD-2026-124792 · Source: ENISA EUVD
  16. 2026-11-13 00:37 UTCEchelonGraph re-scoredFirst assessed: 2.9 LOW
  17. 2026-11-13 00:36 UTCMITRE cvelistV5first tracked

Frequently asked(5)

What is CVE-2026-127916?
CVE-2026-127916 is a low-severity vulnerability; its CVE record was published on November 13, 2026. bootutil_img_hash() computes the image digest over ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size + ih_protect_tlv_size bytes, all three taken from the candidate image's header, and reads that span out of the slot without checking that it fits in the flash area. The three sizes are also summed without an overflow…
When was the CVE record for CVE-2026-127916 published?
The CVE record for CVE-2026-127916 was published on November 13, 2026. That is the record's publication date; the vulnerability itself may have been made public earlier. EchelonGraph's copy of the record carries a last-modified date of November 17, 2026; the record at its source may have been updated since.
Is CVE-2026-127916 actively exploited?
CVE-2026-127916 is not currently on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. FIRST EPSS estimates a 0.2% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days (4th percentile of EPSS-scored CVEs).
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-127916?
CVE-2026-127916 has a CVSS base score of 2.9 (a secondary CVSS source that NVD displays; NVD's own analysis pending).
How do I remediate CVE-2026-127916?
A fix for CVE-2026-127916 is referenced (a reference tagged "Patch", often a source commit), but EchelonGraph has no release containing it on record. Check that reference and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains the fix and update to it; until then, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation.

Dependency Blast Radius

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