EchelonGraph verdictPlan a fixRemediate within your standard update timelines (the SSVC decision on this page).
- •High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: —CVSS: 9.1Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed
Upgrade to Meridian 2024.3.14, 2025.0.11, 2026.0.1 and Horizon 36.0.5 or newer (from the CVE record's solution, The OpenNMS Group) — apply it.
An authorization bypass vulnerability exists in the REST API of multiple versions of OpenNMS Meridian and Horizon. The /rest/** Spring Security filter chains authorize requests with intercept-url rules that name the HTTP method as an uppercase token, compare the method case-sensitively, and have no terminal deny rule. A request that uses a non-canonical (for example lowercase) method token matches no rule and is processed without authentication. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can read the monitored inventory and can create, modify, or delete resources through the REST API, which includes injecting events to fabricate or suppress alarms. The /rest/alarms chain has the same missing deny rule and discloses whether an alarm exists through a difference in the response. The fix adds a terminal deny rule to each REST filter chain.
The solution is to upgrade to Meridian 2024.3.14, 2025.0.11, 2026.0.1 and Horizon 36.0.5 or newer. Meridian and Horizon installation instructions state that they are intended for installation within an organization's private networks and should not be directly accessible from the Internet.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
Upgrade to Meridian 2024.3.14, 2025.0.11, 2026.0.1 and Horizon 36.0.5 or newer (from the CVE record's solution, The OpenNMS Group). Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it