Use of a less trusted source in the DKIM signing of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to have mail they write signed with the DKIM key of a domain the server hosts, so that it passes DKIM and DMARC for that domain at other receivers. With DKIM signing enabled for a hosted domain, the server signed every message on its first delivery pass as the domain named in its From header, before local delivery, whatever the message's origin and without checking that its sender had authenticated. A sender anywhere could therefore send the server, as ordinary inbound mail, a message whose From is any address at such a domain, and the server signed it with that domain's key. Every copy the server then sent on to an address outside carried a valid signature aligned with the forged From, whatever the domain's DMARC policy: an account's forward, a mail rule's forward or copy, a Sieve redirect, an alias or distribution list with an outside member, the mirror copy, a managed-list or journal copy, or a message released from quarantine. A signed copy can also be re-sent to other recipients while the domain's key is unchanged. Exploitation needs DKIM signing to be enabled for the hosted domain (it is off until configured) and, for the forgery to leave the server, a forward, alias, list or rule that carries the domain's mail to an outside address. The signer likewise signed a message submitted over authenticated SMTP as whatever hosted domain its From header named, a header authenticated SMTP does not hold to the submitting account, so that an account of one hosted domain could have mail written in the name of another hosted domain signed with that domain's key; this mattered where the server holds signed-in senders to their own envelope addresses (SmtpAuthenticatedSenderCheck, off by default), as the signature was then the remaining way for such mail to pass the other domain's DMARC policy.
CVE-2026-107567
“—” beside the score: it is equal to the CVSS score beside it.
Score 7.5 from GitHub Security Advisory (severity: HIGH) published 2026-10-19. A secondary CVSS source baseline 7.5; sources differ by 0.0.
- High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
Upgrade to hMailServer 6.3.7 (from the CVE record's solution, GitLab Inc.) — apply it.
- CVSS v3
- 7.5
- EG Score
- 7.5HIGHhigh confidence
- EG Risk
- 49EG Risk 49/100
EG Risk is EchelonGraph's 0–100 priority score. It fuses impact severity (EG Severity, the CVSS base score, never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score) with real-world exploitation and automatability, under weights EchelonGraph set by hand, so you can rank equal-severity CVEs and fix the most dangerous first. Higher = act sooner.
How it’s computed (value × EchelonGraph’s weight)Severity75% × 45%Impact severity (EG Severity): CVSS 7.5 of 10. Never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score.Exploitation0.2% × 40%FIRST EPSS: the 30-day exploitation probability when EchelonGraph scored this CVE.Automatability100% × 15%CISA's SSVC Automatable value: yes (Vulnrichment).SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph): Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE.Action: Upgrade to hMailServer 6.3.7 (from the CVE record's solution, GitLab Inc.). Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high. - EPSS PROB
- 0.2%
- EPSS %ILE
- 5th
- KEV
- Not listed
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.5 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-20). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
Upgrade to hMailServer 6.3.7 (from the CVE record's solution, GitLab Inc.). Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it
Published
October 19, 2026
Last Modified
October 20, 2026
Advisory Details (2)
Auto-updated Oct 19, 2026DKIM signing: mail from an outside, unauthenticated sender whose From named a hosted domain was signed with that domain's key, and so was every forward, redirect, alias or list copy of it, which then passed DMARC (6.0.0-6.3.6) (#84) · Issues · hmailserver / hMailServer · GitLab
https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/work_items/84hMailServer 6.3.7 · hmailserver / hMailServer · GitLab
https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/releases/v6.3.7Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-107567(1)
These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.
Weakness Classification(1)
MITRE Common Weakness Enumeration — the root-cause categories this CVE belongs to.
Data Freshness Timeline
(refreshed 11× in last 7d / 11× in last 30d)
Each row is a time one of our pipelines fetched, updated or re-scored this CVE. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed it from the CNA feed. An arrow marks a change the record states ("CVSS v3 → 9.1"); EPSS and GHSA rows show the values recorded at that time, not what changed (EPSS values are rounded; hover one for the exact figures). Most recent first.
- 2026-10-21 16:32 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.2% · 5th percentile
- 2026-10-20 20:26 UTCEG score recompute
- 2026-10-20 20:26 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-8h9p-r7cp-qhr5 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
- 2026-10-20 19:38 UTCEG score recompute
- 2026-10-20 19:38 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-8h9p-r7cp-qhr5 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
- 2026-10-20 16:32 UTCEPSS rescoreEPSS 0.2% · 5th percentile
- 2026-10-19 21:36 UTCEG score recompute
- 2026-10-19 21:36 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-8h9p-r7cp-qhr5 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
- 2026-10-19 16:31 UTCEG score recompute
- 2026-10-19 15:49 UTCEG score recomputeFirst assessed: 7.5 HIGH
- 2026-10-19 15:47 UTCMITRE cvelistV5first tracked
Related CVEs(same CWE)
Frequently asked(5)
What is CVE-2026-107567?
When was the CVE record for CVE-2026-107567 published?
Is CVE-2026-107567 actively exploited?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-107567?
How do I remediate CVE-2026-107567?
Dependency Blast Radius
Explore the affected products and dependency analysis for CVE-2026-107567
Is Your Infrastructure Affected by CVE-2026-107567?
EchelonGraph automatically scans your cloud infrastructure and maps CVE exposure using blast radius analysis.