In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: caam - Prevent crash on suspend with iMX8QM / iMX8ULP
Since the CAAM on these SoCs is managed by another ARM core, called the
SECO (Security Controller) on iMX8QM and Secure Enclave on iMX8ULP, which
also reserves access to register page 0 suspend operations cannot touch
this page.
This is similar to when running OPTEE, where OPTEE will reserve page 0.
Track this situation using a new state variable no_page0, reflecting if
page 0 is reserved elsewhere, either by other management cores in SoC or
by OPTEE.
Replace the optee_en check in suspend/resume with the new check.
optee_en cannot go away as it's needed elsewhere to gate OPTEE specific
situations.
Fixes the following splat at suspend:
Internal error: synchronous external abort: 0000000096000010 [#1] SMP
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP ACU6C (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : readl+0x0/0x18
lr : rd_reg32+0x18/0x3c
sp : ffffffc08192ba20
x29: ffffffc08192ba20 x28: ffffff8025190000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffffffc0808ae808 x25: ffffffc080922338 x24: ffffff8020e89090
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffffc080922000 x21: ffffff8020e89010
x20: ffffffc080387ef8 x19: ffffff8020e89010 x18: 000000005d8000d5
x17: 0000000030f35963 x16: 000000008f785f3f x15: 000000003b8ef57c
x14: 00000000c418aef8 x13: 00000000f5fea526 x12: 0000000000000001
x11: 0000000000000002 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : ffffff8025190870 x7 : ffffff8021726880 x6 : 0000000000000002
x5 : ffffff80217268f0 x4 : ffffff8021726880 x3 : ffffffc081200000
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffffff8020e89010 x0 : ffffffc081200004
Call trace:
readl+0x0/0x18
caam_ctrl_suspend+0x30/0xdc
dpm_run_callback.constprop.0+0x24/0x5c
device_suspend+0x170/0x2e8
dpm_suspend+0xa0/0x104
dpm_suspend_start+0x48/0x50
suspend_devices_and_enter+0x7c/0x45c
pm_suspend+0x148/0x160
state_store+0xb4/0xf8
kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x24
sysfs_kf_write+0x38/0x48
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xb4/0x178
vfs_write+0x118/0x178
ksys_write+0x6c/0xd0
__arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x1c
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x64/0xb0
do_el0_svc+0x90/0xb0
el0_svc+0x18/0x44
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0x124
el0t_64_sync+0x150/0x154
Code: 88dffc21 88dffc21 5ac00800 d65f03c0 (b9400000)
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it