In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/gpu: Fix crash when throttling GPU immediately during boot
There is a small chance that the GPU is already hot during boot. In that
case, the call to of_devfreq_cooling_register() will immediately try to
apply devfreq cooling, as seen in the following crash:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000014110
pc : a6xx_gpu_busy+0x1c/0x58 [msm]
lr : msm_devfreq_get_dev_status+0xbc/0x140 [msm]
Call trace:
a6xx_gpu_busy+0x1c/0x58 [msm] (P)
devfreq_simple_ondemand_func+0x3c/0x150
devfreq_update_target+0x44/0xd8
qos_max_notifier_call+0x30/0x84
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6c/0xa0
pm_qos_update_target+0xd0/0x110
freq_qos_apply+0x3c/0x74
apply_constraint+0x88/0x148
__dev_pm_qos_update_request+0x7c/0xcc
dev_pm_qos_update_request+0x38/0x5c
devfreq_cooling_set_cur_state+0x98/0xf0
__thermal_cdev_update+0x64/0xb4
thermal_cdev_update+0x4c/0x58
step_wise_manage+0x1f0/0x318
__thermal_zone_device_update+0x278/0x424
__thermal_cooling_device_register+0x2bc/0x308
thermal_of_cooling_device_register+0x10/0x1c
of_devfreq_cooling_register_power+0x240/0x2bc
of_devfreq_cooling_register+0x14/0x20
msm_devfreq_init+0xc4/0x1a0 [msm]
msm_gpu_init+0x304/0x574 [msm]
adreno_gpu_init+0x1c4/0x2e0 [msm]
a6xx_gpu_init+0x5c8/0x9c8 [msm]
adreno_bind+0x2a8/0x33c [msm]
...
At this point we haven't initialized the GMU at all yet, so we cannot read
the GMU registers inside a6xx_gpu_busy(). A similar issue was fixed before
in commit 6694482a70e9 ("drm/msm: Avoid unclocked GMU register access in
6xx gpu_busy"): msm_devfreq_init() does call devfreq_suspend_device(), but
unlike msm_devfreq_suspend(), it doesn't set the df->suspended flag
accordingly. This means the df->suspended flag does not match the actual
devfreq state after initialization and msm_devfreq_get_dev_status() will
end up accessing GMU registers, causing the crash.
Fix this by setting df->suspended correctly during initialization.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/650772/
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it