In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/huc: Fix fence not released on early probe errors
HuC delayed loading fence, introduced with commit 27536e03271da
("drm/i915/huc: track delayed HuC load with a fence"), is registered with
object tracker early on driver probe but unregistered only from driver
remove, which is not called on early probe errors. Since its memory is
allocated under devres, then released anyway, it may happen to be
allocated again to the fence and reused on future driver probes, resulting
in kernel warnings that taint the kernel:
<4> [309.731371] ------------[ cut here ]------------
<3> [309.731373] ODEBUG: init destroyed (active state 0) object: ffff88813d7dd2e0 object type: i915_sw_fence hint: sw_fence_dummy_notify+0x0/0x20 [i915]
<4> [309.731575] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3161 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x93/0xf0
...
<4> [309.731693] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 3161 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.14.0-CI_DRM_16362-gf0fd77956987+ #1
...
<4> [309.731700] RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x93/0xf0
...
<4> [309.731728] Call Trace:
<4> [309.731730]
...
<4> [309.731949] __debug_object_init+0x17b/0x1c0
<4> [309.731957] debug_object_init+0x34/0x50
<4> [309.732126] __i915_sw_fence_init+0x34/0x60 [i915]
<4> [309.732256] intel_huc_init_early+0x4b/0x1d0 [i915]
<4> [309.732468] intel_uc_init_early+0x61/0x680 [i915]
<4> [309.732667] intel_gt_common_init_early+0x105/0x130 [i915]
<4> [309.732804] intel_root_gt_init_early+0x63/0x80 [i915]
<4> [309.732938] i915_driver_probe+0x1fa/0xeb0 [i915]
<4> [309.733075] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915]
<4> [309.733198] local_pci_probe+0x44/0xb0
<4> [309.733203] pci_device_probe+0xf4/0x270
<4> [309.733209] really_probe+0xee/0x3c0
<4> [309.733215] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180
<4> [309.733219] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0
<4> [309.733223] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220
<4> [309.733230] bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xe0
<4> [309.733236] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30
<4> [309.733239] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290
<4> [309.733244] driver_register+0x5e/0x130
<4> [309.733247] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90
<4> [309.733251] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915]
<4> [309.733413] i915_init+0x34/0x120 [i915]
<4> [309.733655] do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0
<4> [309.733667] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0
<4> [309.733671] load_module+0x25ff/0x2890
<4> [309.733688] init_module_from_file+0x97/0xe0
<4> [309.733701] idempotent_init_module+0x118/0x330
<4> [309.733711] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100
<4> [309.733715] x64_sys_call+0x1f37/0x2650
<4> [309.733719] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180
<4> [309.733763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
<4> [309.733792]
...
<4> [309.733806] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
That scenario is most easily reproducible with
igt@i915_module_load@reload-with-fault-injection.
Fix the issue by moving the cleanup step to driver release path.
(cherry picked from commit 795dbde92fe5c6996a02a5b579481de73035e7bf)
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-07). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it