Bypass/Injection vulnerability in Apache Camel components under particular conditions.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.10.0 through <= 4.10.1, from 4.8.0 through <= 4.8.4, from 3.10.0 through <= 3.22.3.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.10.2 for 4.10.x LTS, 4.8.5 for 4.8.x LTS and 3.22.4 for 3.x releases.
This vulnerability is present in Camel's default incoming header filter, that allows an attacker to include Camel specific
headers that for some Camel components can alter the behaviours such as the camel-bean component, to call another method
on the bean, than was coded in the application. In the camel-jms component, then a malicious header can be used to send
the message to another queue (on the same broker) than was coded in the application. This could also be seen by using the camel-exec component
The attacker would need to inject custom headers, such as HTTP protocols. So if you have Camel applications that are
directly connected to the internet via HTTP, then an attacker could include malicious HTTP headers in the HTTP requests
that are send to the Camel application.
All the known Camel HTTP component such as camel-servlet, camel-jetty, camel-undertow, camel-platform-http, and camel-netty-http would be vulnerable out of the box.
In these conditions an attacker could be able to forge a Camel header name and make the bean component invoking other methods in the same bean.
In terms of usage of the default header filter strategy the list of components using that is:
* camel-activemq
* camel-activemq6
* camel-amqp
* camel-aws2-sqs
* camel-azure-servicebus
* camel-cxf-rest
* camel-cxf-soap
* camel-http
* camel-jetty
* camel-jms
* camel-kafka
* camel-knative
* camel-mail
* camel-nats
* camel-netty-http
* camel-platform-http
* camel-rest
* camel-sjms
* camel-spring-rabbitmq
* camel-stomp
* camel-tahu
* camel-undertow
* camel-xmpp
The vulnerability arises due to a bug in the default filtering mechanism that only blocks headers starting with "Camel", "camel", or "org.apache.camel.".
Mitigation: You can easily work around this in your Camel applications by removing the headers in your Camel routes. There are many ways of doing this, also globally or per route. This means you could use the removeHeaders EIP, to filter out anything like "cAmel, cAMEL" etc, or in general everything not starting with "Camel", "camel" or "org.apache.camel.".
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (9.0): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 9.0 is EPSS's lift toward 9.0 from its impact severity (EG Severity, CVSS 5.6 MEDIUM): a likelihood of exploitation, not impact.
- EG Severity
- 5.6 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.NVD CVSS v3 · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 97% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-22). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation public PoC (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it