In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix crash on probe for DPLL enabled E810 LOM
The E810 Lan On Motherboard (LOM) design is vendor specific. Intel
provides the reference design, but it is up to vendor on the final
product design. For some cases, like Linux DPLL support, the static
values defined in the driver does not reflect the actual LOM design.
Current implementation of dpll pins is causing the crash on probe
of the ice driver for such DPLL enabled E810 LOM designs:
WARNING: (...) at drivers/dpll/dpll_core.c:495 dpll_pin_get+0x2c4/0x330
...
Call Trace:
? __warn+0x83/0x130
? dpll_pin_get+0x2c4/0x330
? report_bug+0x1b7/0x1d0
? handle_bug+0x42/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? dpll_pin_get+0x117/0x330
? dpll_pin_get+0x2c4/0x330
? dpll_pin_get+0x117/0x330
ice_dpll_get_pins.isra.0+0x52/0xe0 [ice]
...
The number of dpll pins enabled by LOM vendor is greater than expected
and defined in the driver for Intel designed NICs, which causes the crash.
Prevent the crash and allow generic pin initialization within Linux DPLL
subsystem for DPLL enabled E810 LOM designs.
Newly designed solution for described issue will be based on "per HW
design" pin initialization. It requires pin information dynamically
acquired from the firmware and is already in progress, planned for
next-tree only.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-07). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it