The Syrus4 IoT gateway utilizes an unsecured MQTT server to download and execute arbitrary commands, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute code on any Syrus4 device connected to the cloud service. The MQTT server also leaks the location, video and diagnostic data from each connected device. An attacker who knows the IP address of the server is able to connect and perform the following operations:
* Get location data of the vehicle the device is connected to
* Send CAN bus messages via the ECU module ( https://syrus.digitalcomtech.com/docs/ecu-1 https://syrus.digitalcomtech.com/docs/ecu-1 )
* Immobilize the vehicle via the safe-immobilizer module ( https://syrus.digitalcomtech.com/docs/system-tools#safe-immobilization https://syrus.digitalcomtech.com/docs/system-tools#safe-immobilization )
* Get live video through the connected video camera
* Send audio messages to the driver ( https://syrus.digitalcomtech.com/docs/system-tools#apx-tts https://syrus.digitalcomtech.com/docs/system-tools#apx-tts )
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (10.0): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 10.0 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 10.0 CRITICALCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 1.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-22). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 3 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
No fix is confirmed yet. Restrict network exposure of the affected system within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high, and watch for a fix.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)3 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it