In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: fix warning when handle discover_identity message
Since both source and sink device can send discover_identity message in
PD3, kernel may dump below warning:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 169 at drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c:1446 tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 169 Comm: 1-0050 Not tainted 6.1.1-00038-g6a3c36cf1da2-dirty #567
Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT)
pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0
lr : tcpm_queue_vdm+0x2c/0xf0
sp : ffff80000c19bcd0
x29: ffff80000c19bcd0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: ffff0000d11c8ab8
x26: ffff0000d11cc000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000ff008081
x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 00000000ff00a081 x21: ffff80000c19bdbc
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0000d11c8080 x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff0000d716f580
x14: 0000000000000001 x13: ffff0000d716f507 x12: 0000000000000001
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000020 x9 : 00000000000ee098
x8 : 00000000ffffffff x7 : 000000000000001c x6 : ffff0000d716f580
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : ffff80000c19bdbc x1 : 00000000ff00a081 x0 : 0000000000000004
Call trace:
tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0
tcpm_pd_rx_handler+0x340/0x1ab0
kthread_worker_fn+0xcc/0x18c
kthread+0x10c/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Below sequences may trigger this warning:
tcpm_send_discover_work(work)
tcpm_send_vdm(port, USB_SID_PD, CMD_DISCOVER_IDENT, NULL, 0);
tcpm_queue_vdm(port, header, data, count);
port->vdm_state = VDM_STATE_READY;
vdm_state_machine_work(work);
<-- received discover_identity from partner
vdm_run_state_machine(port);
port->vdm_state = VDM_STATE_SEND_MESSAGE;
mod_vdm_delayed_work(port, x);
tcpm_pd_rx_handler(work);
tcpm_pd_data_request(port, msg);
tcpm_handle_vdm_request(port, msg->payload, cnt);
tcpm_queue_vdm(port, response[0], &response[1], rlen - 1);
--> WARN_ON(port->vdm_state > VDM_STATE_DONE);
For this case, the state machine could still send out discover
identity message later if we skip current discover_identity message.
So we should handle the received message firstly and override the pending
discover_identity message without warning in this case. Then, a delayed
send_discover work will send discover_identity message again.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-05). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it