In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Avoid memory allocation in iommu_suspend()
The iommu_suspend() syscore suspend callback is invoked with IRQ disabled.
Allocating memory with the GFP_KERNEL flag may re-enable IRQs during
the suspend callback, which can cause intermittent suspend/hibernation
problems with the following kernel traces:
Calling iommu_suspend+0x0/0x1d0
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at kernel/time/timekeeping.c:868 ktime_get+0x9b/0xb0
...
CPU: 0 PID: 15 Comm: rcu_preempt Tainted: G U E 6.3-intel #r1
RIP: 0010:ktime_get+0x9b/0xb0
...
Call Trace:
tick_sched_timer+0x22/0x90
? __pfx_tick_sched_timer+0x10/0x10
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x111/0x2b0
hrtimer_interrupt+0xfa/0x230
__sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x63/0x140
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x7b/0xa0
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1f/0x30
...
------------[ cut here ]------------
Interrupts enabled after iommu_suspend+0x0/0x1d0
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 27420 at drivers/base/syscore.c:68 syscore_suspend+0x147/0x270
CPU: 0 PID: 27420 Comm: rtcwake Tainted: G U W E 6.3-intel #r1
RIP: 0010:syscore_suspend+0x147/0x270
...
Call Trace:
hibernation_snapshot+0x25b/0x670
hibernate+0xcd/0x390
state_store+0xcf/0xe0
kobj_attr_store+0x13/0x30
sysfs_kf_write+0x3f/0x50
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x200
vfs_write+0x1fd/0x3c0
ksys_write+0x6f/0xf0
__x64_sys_write+0x1d/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Given that only 4 words memory is needed, avoid the memory allocation in
iommu_suspend().
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-17). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it