In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix mr->map double free
rxe_mr_cleanup() which tries to free mr->map again will be called when
rxe_mr_init_user() fails:
CPU: 0 PID: 4917 Comm: rdma_flush_serv Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.1.0-rc1-roce-flush+ #25
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x5d
panic+0x19e/0x349
end_report.part.0+0x54/0x7c
kasan_report.cold+0xa/0xf
rxe_mr_cleanup+0x9d/0xf0 [rdma_rxe]
__rxe_cleanup+0x10a/0x1e0 [rdma_rxe]
rxe_reg_user_mr+0xb7/0xd0 [rdma_rxe]
ib_uverbs_reg_mr+0x26a/0x480 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x1a2/0x250 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1397/0x15a0 [ib_uverbs]
This issue was firstly exposed since commit b18c7da63fcb ("RDMA/rxe: Fix
memory leak in error path code") and then we fixed it in commit
8ff5f5d9d8cf ("RDMA/rxe: Prevent double freeing rxe_map_set()") but this
fix was reverted together at last by commit 1e75550648da (Revert
"RDMA/rxe: Create duplicate mapping tables for FMRs")
Simply let rxe_mr_cleanup() always handle freeing the mr->map once it is
successfully allocated.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-20). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it