In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: hisilicon/sec - don't sleep when in softirq
When kunpeng920 encryption driver is used to deencrypt and decrypt
packets during the softirq, it is not allowed to use mutex lock. The
kernel will report the following error:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/57/0/0x00000300
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e4
show_stack+0x20/0x2c
dump_stack+0xd8/0x140
__schedule_bug+0x68/0x80
__schedule+0x728/0x840
schedule+0x50/0xe0
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x18/0x24
__mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x594/0x5dc
__mutex_lock_slowpath+0x1c/0x30
mutex_lock+0x50/0x60
sec_request_init+0x8c/0x1a0 [hisi_sec2]
sec_process+0x28/0x1ac [hisi_sec2]
sec_skcipher_crypto+0xf4/0x1d4 [hisi_sec2]
sec_skcipher_encrypt+0x1c/0x30 [hisi_sec2]
crypto_skcipher_encrypt+0x2c/0x40
crypto_authenc_encrypt+0xc8/0xfc [authenc]
crypto_aead_encrypt+0x2c/0x40
echainiv_encrypt+0x144/0x1a0 [echainiv]
crypto_aead_encrypt+0x2c/0x40
esp_output_tail+0x348/0x5c0 [esp4]
esp_output+0x120/0x19c [esp4]
xfrm_output_one+0x25c/0x4d4
xfrm_output_resume+0x6c/0x1fc
xfrm_output+0xac/0x3c0
xfrm4_output+0x64/0x130
ip_build_and_send_pkt+0x158/0x20c
tcp_v4_send_synack+0xdc/0x1f0
tcp_conn_request+0x7d0/0x994
tcp_v4_conn_request+0x58/0x6c
tcp_v6_conn_request+0xf0/0x100
tcp_rcv_state_process+0x1cc/0xd60
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10c/0x250
tcp_v4_rcv+0xfc4/0x10a4
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xf4/0x200
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x58/0x70
ip_local_deliver+0x68/0x120
ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x70/0x94
ip_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0+0x17c/0x1d0
ip_sublist_rcv+0x40/0xb0
ip_list_rcv+0x140/0x1dc
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x154/0x28c
__netif_receive_skb_list+0x120/0x1a0
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0xe4/0x1f0
napi_complete_done+0x70/0x1f0
gro_cell_poll+0x9c/0xb0
napi_poll+0xcc/0x264
net_rx_action+0xd4/0x21c
__do_softirq+0x130/0x358
irq_exit+0x11c/0x13c
__handle_domain_irq+0x88/0xf0
gic_handle_irq+0x78/0x2c0
el1_irq+0xb8/0x140
arch_cpu_idle+0x18/0x40
default_idle_call+0x5c/0x1c0
cpuidle_idle_call+0x174/0x1b0
do_idle+0xc8/0x160
cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x11c
secondary_start_kernel+0x158/0x1e4
softirq: huh, entered softirq 3 NET_RX 0000000093774ee4 with
preempt_count 00000100, exited with fffffe00?
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.4% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it