In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix the sk->sk_forward_alloc warning of sk_stream_kill_queues
When running test_sockmap selftests, the following warning appears:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 197 at net/core/stream.c:205 sk_stream_kill_queues+0xd3/0xf0
Call Trace:
inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x55/0x110
tcp_rcv_state_process+0xd28/0x1380
? tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77/0x2c0
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77/0x2c0
__release_sock+0x106/0x130
__tcp_close+0x1a7/0x4e0
tcp_close+0x20/0x70
inet_release+0x3c/0x80
__sock_release+0x3a/0xb0
sock_close+0x14/0x20
__fput+0xa3/0x260
task_work_run+0x59/0xb0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1b3/0x1c0
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The root case is in commit 84472b436e76 ("bpf, sockmap: Fix more uncharged
while msg has more_data"), where I used msg->sg.size to replace the tosend,
causing breakage:
if (msg->apply_bytes && msg->apply_bytes < tosend)
tosend = psock->apply_bytes;
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-05). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it