In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: don't leak tagger-owned storage on switch driver unbind
In the initial commit dc452a471dba ("net: dsa: introduce tagger-owned
storage for private and shared data"), we had a call to
tag_ops->disconnect(dst) issued from dsa_tree_free(), which is called at
tree teardown time.
There were problems with connecting to a switch tree as a whole, so this
got reworked to connecting to individual switches within the tree. In
this process, tag_ops->disconnect(ds) was made to be called only from
switch.c (cross-chip notifiers emitted as a result of dynamic tag proto
changes), but the normal driver teardown code path wasn't replaced with
anything.
Solve this problem by adding a function that does the opposite of
dsa_switch_setup_tag_protocol(), which is called from the equivalent
spot in dsa_switch_teardown(). The positioning here also ensures that we
won't have any use-after-free in tagging protocol (*rcv) ops, since the
teardown sequence is as follows:
dsa_tree_teardown
-> dsa_tree_teardown_master
-> dsa_master_teardown
-> unsets master->dsa_ptr, making no further packets match the
ETH_P_XDSA packet type handler
-> dsa_tree_teardown_ports
-> dsa_port_teardown
-> dsa_slave_destroy
-> unregisters DSA net devices, there is even a synchronize_net()
in unregister_netdevice_many()
-> dsa_tree_teardown_switches
-> dsa_switch_teardown
-> dsa_switch_teardown_tag_protocol
-> finally frees the tagger-owned storage
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it