In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio: use virtio_device_ready() in virtio_device_restore()
After waking up a suspended VM, the kernel prints the following trace
for virtio drivers which do not directly call virtio_device_ready() in
the .restore:
PM: suspend exit
irq 22: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option)
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x38/0x49
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
__report_bad_irq+0x3a/0xaf
note_interrupt.cold+0xb/0x60
handle_irq_event+0x71/0x80
handle_fasteoi_irq+0x95/0x1e0
__common_interrupt+0x6b/0x110
common_interrupt+0x63/0xe0
asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
? __do_softirq+0x75/0x2f3
irq_exit_rcu+0x93/0xe0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xac/0xd0
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
arch_cpu_idle+0x12/0x20
default_idle_call+0x39/0xf0
do_idle+0x1b5/0x210
cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30
start_secondary+0xf3/0x100
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xc3/0xcb
handlers:
[<000000008f9bac49>] vp_interrupt
[<000000008f9bac49>] vp_interrupt
Disabling IRQ #22
This happens because we don't invoke .enable_cbs callback in
virtio_device_restore(). That callback is used by some transports
(e.g. virtio-pci) to enable interrupts.
Let's fix it, by calling virtio_device_ready() as we do in
virtio_dev_probe(). This function calls .enable_cts callback and sets
DRIVER_OK status bit.
This fix also avoids setting DRIVER_OK twice for those drivers that
call virtio_device_ready() in the .restore.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it