In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath5k: fix OOB in ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111
The bug was found during fuzzing. Stacktrace locates it in
ath5k_eeprom_convert_pcal_info_5111.
When none of the curve is selected in the loop, idx can go
up to AR5K_EEPROM_N_PD_CURVES. The line makes pd out of bound.
pd = &chinfo[pier].pd_curves[idx];
There are many OOB writes using pd later in the code. So I
added a sanity check for idx. Checks for other loops involving
AR5K_EEPROM_N_PD_CURVES are not needed as the loop index is not
used outside the loops.
The patch is NOT tested with real device.
The following is the fuzzing report
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
Write of size 1 at addr ffff8880174a4d60 by task modprobe/214
CPU: 0 PID: 214 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.6.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x76/0xa0
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x16/0x200
? ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
? ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
__kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x7c
? ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
kasan_report+0xe/0x20
ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_5111+0x126a/0x1390 [ath5k]
? apic_timer_interrupt+0xa/0x20
? ath5k_eeprom_init_11a_pcal_freq+0xbc0/0xbc0 [ath5k]
? ath5k_pci_eeprom_read+0x228/0x3c0 [ath5k]
ath5k_eeprom_init+0x2513/0x6290 [ath5k]
? ath5k_eeprom_init_11a_pcal_freq+0xbc0/0xbc0 [ath5k]
? usleep_range+0xb8/0x100
? apic_timer_interrupt+0xa/0x20
? ath5k_eeprom_read_pcal_info_2413+0x2f20/0x2f20 [ath5k]
ath5k_hw_init+0xb60/0x1970 [ath5k]
ath5k_init_ah+0x6fe/0x2530 [ath5k]
? kasprintf+0xa6/0xe0
? ath5k_stop+0x140/0x140 [ath5k]
? _dev_notice+0xf6/0xf6
? apic_timer_interrupt+0xa/0x20
ath5k_pci_probe.cold+0x29a/0x3d6 [ath5k]
? ath5k_pci_eeprom_read+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ath5k]
? mutex_lock+0x89/0xd0
? ath5k_pci_eeprom_read+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ath5k]
local_pci_probe+0xd3/0x160
pci_device_probe+0x23f/0x3e0
? pci_device_remove+0x280/0x280
? pci_device_remove+0x280/0x280
really_probe+0x209/0x5d0
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.1): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.1 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.1 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-03). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it