In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Fix RX consumer index logic in the error path.
In bnxt_rx_pkt(), the RX buffers are expected to complete in order.
If the RX consumer index indicates an out of order buffer completion,
it means we are hitting a hardware bug and the driver will abort all
remaining RX packets and reset the RX ring. The RX consumer index
that we pass to bnxt_discard_rx() is not correct. We should be
passing the current index (tmp_raw_cons) instead of the old index
(raw_cons). This bug can cause us to be at the wrong index when
trying to abort the next RX packet. It can crash like this:
#0 [ffff9bbcdf5c39a8] machine_kexec at ffffffff9b05e007
#1 [ffff9bbcdf5c3a00] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9b111232
#2 [ffff9bbcdf5c3ad0] panic at ffffffff9b07d61e
#3 [ffff9bbcdf5c3b50] oops_end at ffffffff9b030978
#4 [ffff9bbcdf5c3b78] no_context at ffffffff9b06aaf0
#5 [ffff9bbcdf5c3bd8] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9b06ae2e
#6 [ffff9bbcdf5c3c28] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9b06af24
#7 [ffff9bbcdf5c3c38] __do_page_fault at ffffffff9b06b67e
#8 [ffff9bbcdf5c3cb0] do_page_fault at ffffffff9b06bb12
#9 [ffff9bbcdf5c3ce0] page_fault at ffffffff9bc015c5
[exception RIP: bnxt_rx_pkt+237]
RIP: ffffffffc0259cdd RSP: ffff9bbcdf5c3d98 RFLAGS: 00010213
RAX: 000000005dd8097f RBX: ffff9ba4cb11b7e0 RCX: ffffa923cf6e9000
RDX: 0000000000000fff RSI: 0000000000000627 RDI: 0000000000001000
RBP: ffff9bbcdf5c3e60 R8: 0000000000420003 R9: 000000000000020d
R10: ffffa923cf6ec138 R11: ffff9bbcdf5c3e83 R12: ffff9ba4d6f928c0
R13: ffff9ba4cac28080 R14: ffff9ba4cb11b7f0 R15: ffff9ba4d5a30000
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-17). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it