In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: aspeed: fix clock handling logic
Video engine uses eclk and vclk for its clock sources and its reset
control is coupled with eclk so the current clock enabling sequence works
like below.
Enable eclk
De-assert Video Engine reset
10ms delay
Enable vclk
It introduces improper reset on the Video Engine hardware and eventually
the hardware generates unexpected DMA memory transfers that can corrupt
memory region in random and sporadic patterns. This issue is observed
very rarely on some specific AST2500 SoCs but it causes a critical
kernel panic with making a various shape of signature so it's extremely
hard to debug. Moreover, the issue is observed even when the video
engine is not actively used because udevd turns on the video engine
hardware for a short time to make a query in every boot.
To fix this issue, this commit changes the clock handling logic to make
the reset de-assertion triggered after enabling both eclk and vclk. Also,
it adds clk_unprepare call for a case when probe fails.
clk: ast2600: fix reset settings for eclk and vclk
Video engine reset setting should be coupled with eclk to match it
with the setting for previous Aspeed SoCs which is defined in
clk-aspeed.c since all Aspeed SoCs are sharing a single video engine
driver. Also, reset bit 6 is defined as 'Video Engine' reset in
datasheet so it should be de-asserted when eclk is enabled. This
commit fixes the setting.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-17). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it