CVE-2009-0654

Tor 0.2.0.28, and probably 0.2.0.34 and earlier, allows remote attackers, with control of an entry router and an exit router, to confirm that a sender and receiver are communicating via vectors involving (1) replaying, (2) modifying, (3) inserting, or (4) deleting a single cell, and then observing cell recognition errors at the exit router. NOTE: the vendor disputes the significance of this issue, noting that the product's design "accepted end-to-end correlation as an attack that is too expensive to solve."

🔗 References (6)

• cve@mitrehttp://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough
• cve@mitrehttp://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-dc-09/bh-dc-09-archives.html#Fu
• cve@mitrehttp://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Fu/BlackHat-DC-09-Fu-Break-Tors-Anonymity.pdf
• af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108http://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough
• af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-dc-09/bh-dc-09-archives.html#Fu
• af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Fu/BlackHat-DC-09-Fu-Break-Tors-Anonymity.pdf